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Article 
More Is More: Strengthening Free 
Exercise, Speech, and Association 
John D. Inazu† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The contours of our expressive liberties are shaped not only 
by legal doctrine but also by cultural views about those liberties 
and the governmental interests with which they intersect. The 
relationship between doctrine and culture is complex and sym-
biotic, and we cannot neatly disentangle the two. As Vincent 
Blasi has noted, even the most well-reasoned doctrine may fal-
ter in the face of widespread and intense pressure, demanding 
that our liberties be sacrificed for the sake of real or imagined 
governmental interests.1 In other words, cultural views matter. 
Prominent scholars like Blasi, Kenneth Karst, and Philip 
Hamburger have suggested that one important means of 
strengthening cultural views about the First Amendment is by 
limiting its protections to “core” interests.2 This intuition car-
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 1. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 478 (1985). 
 2. See id. at 452; Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 
885 (2004); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE 
L.J. 624, 654–55 (1980). 
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ries with it the corollary that stretching a right beyond its core 
may end up weakening that right. For example, in an im-
portant article on the right of intimate association, Karst ex-
pressed concern over an expansive interpretation of the right 
that could “be stretched to cover all our constitutional free-
doms.”3 He warned in a footnote that “First Amendment doc-
trine would become encumbered with new limits and excep-
tions, because some claims inevitably would be rejected” and 
“[f]rom these decisions a doctrinal infection would spread, 
touching even traditional First Amendment concerns.”4 In a 
similar vein, Blasi’s seminal article on the “pathological per-
spective” of the First Amendment counseled that a broad read-
ing of the text could undermine its core protections in times of 
crisis.5 In yet another example, referring specifically to the free 
exercise right, the editors of a leading casebook on law and re-
ligion posit that “[w]hen the protective sweep is [too] broad, the 
courts end up recognizing equally broad governmental discre-
tion to regulate, and that regulatory discretion will apply 
across the board, to the core as well as the periphery of the 
right.”6 The casebook editors conclude that the “inverse relation 
between coverage and protection” is “like taffy” such that “[t]he 
wider we stretch the meaning of [a particular right], the thin-
ner the barrier between us and the government.”7 
Hamburger has asserted the argument most forcefully. His 
generalized worry is that expanding the coverage of First 
Amendment rights might shift absolute protection of a defined 
core to contingent “balancing” for all claims asserted under 
those rights.8 Although he is careful to note that this expansion 
 
 3. Karst, supra note 2, at 654 (1980). Karst’s article likely provided the 
intellectual framework for Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN 
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 136–39 (2012) (discussing these connections). 
 4. Karst, supra note 2, at 654–55 n.140. 
 5. Blasi, supra note 1, at 478. For an early critique of Blasi’s focus on the 
“core” of the First Amendment, see George C. Christie, Why the First Amend-
ment Should Not Be Interpreted from the Pathological Perspective: A Response 
to Professor Blasi, 1986 DUKE L.J. 683 (1986). 
 6. MICHAEL MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 782 
(2011).   
 7. Id. 
 8. Hamburger has asserted this argument in a variety of contexts. See 
generally Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405 
(2007) (speech and press rights); Hamburger, supra note 2 (religious liberty); 
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 
SUP. CT. REV. 271 (speech and press rights). Hamburger has also made the 
argument outside of the First Amendment. See generally Philip Hamburger, 
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does not lead inexorably to diminished rights protection, he 
gestures toward this outcome and offers historical examples.9 
In the context of the speech and press rights, Hamburger ar-
gues that scholars and judges who pushed to expand protection 
beyond the core prohibition on prepublication licensing “have 
ended up carving out government interests not only from the 
expanded periphery but also from the historic core.”10 In the 
context of religious liberty, he contends that “[t]he expansion of 
the First Amendment’s right of free exercise has undermined 
its core.”11 In Hamburger’s words, “more is less.”12 Like Blasi 
and Karst, he worries that expanding the scope or coverage of a 
right might undermine its core protections.13  
We can think of these cautions as arguments for rights con-
finement. On this view, legal doctrine will be most resilient to 
cultural pressures when it is construed narrowly.14 But the in-
terplay between doctrine and cultural views suggests that 
rights confinement is an unproven and, indeed, unprovable, 
theory; we simply do not know in advance whether rights con-
finement will strengthen or even maintain cultural views about 
our liberties. Moreover, it is difficult to think of many historical 
examples of an expanded right compromising the previously 
protected core of a right. That is not generally how precedent 
works.15  
 
Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823 (2009) (discussing the extension 
of constitutional rights to nonresident aliens).  
 9. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 837 (“If a right is defined with greater 
breadth, will this necessarily stimulate demands for a diminution of its avail-
ability? Surely not. Nonetheless, the danger may be inherent in every attempt 
to expand a right, for at some point, as the definition of a right is enlarged, 
there are likely to be reasons for qualifying access.”).   
 10. Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 8, at 414.  
 11. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 874.   
 12. Hamburger, supra note 2. 
 13. Outside of the First Amendment, some of the literature on social 
movements has expressed similar concerns. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 373 (2007) (“[P]rogressives have become fearful that an as-
sertive judiciary can spark a political and cultural backlash that may hurt, 
more than help, progressive values.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
 14. See Blasi, supra note 1, at 453–54. 
 15. There are rare exceptions. The most prominent example is the exten-
sion of the Sixth Amendment jury right to defendants in state prosecutions. As 
Hamburger notes:  
[B]ecause the notion of a jury cuts across the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments, the Court altered the right in both criminal and civil 
cases. The right to a jury in both criminal and civil cases has tradi-
tionally and emphatically been a right to a trial by twelve persons. 
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On the other hand, we know that rights expansion some-
times increases the scope of rights protection. The free speech 
right provides the clearest illustration. Free speech advocates 
have repeatedly argued that courts should increase the scope of 
protection under that right from written and verbal speech to 
symbolic speech, from excluding commercial speech to includ-
ing commercial speech, and from only the right to speak to in-
cluding the right not to speak.16 In all of these cases, the scope 
of the right has expanded without any damage to its core.17 To 
borrow from Hamburger’s terminology, more has meant more.18 
The possibility of rights expansion might also exist for oth-
er rights. Consider the modern right of association.19 The right 
of association and its antecedent, the right of assembly, once 
offered fairly broad (though not absolute) protections to private, 
noncommercial groups.20 But in 1984, the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees split the right of asso-
ciation into component parts of “intimate” and “expressive” as-
 
Today, however, after access to the Sixth Amendment criminal jury 
right has been expanded, the right to a jury, whether in criminal cas-
es under the Sixth Amendment or in civil cases under the Seventh 
Amendment, is merely a right to a trial by half a jury. 
Hamburger, Beyond Protection, supra note 8, at 1966 n.459 (citation omitted). 
 16. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(recognizing a right against compelled speech in the context of non-verbal flag 
salute); cf. John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1123 
(2013) (discussing how fundamental freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment have been extended, such as to “modes of communication that are not 
speech but that function in some ways like speech”). 
 17. See id. at 1122. 
 18. I do not mean to claim that rights expansion has led to a strengthen-
ing of the core. Although that argument is conceptually possible, my claim 
here is more limited; rights expansion has led to some protection for an ex-
panded periphery without damaging the core of the right. Cf. Frederick 
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. 
REV. 285, 315 (“A narrow but strong First Amendment, with its strong princi-
ple universally available for all speech covered by the First Amendment, has 
much to be said for it. First Amendment protection can be like an oil spill, 
thinning out as it broadens. But excess precautions against this danger might 
lead to a First Amendment that is so narrow as to thwart its major purpos-
es.”).   
 19. I focus in this Article on the judicially recognized right of association 
(now generally seen as derived from the First Amendment), but I have else-
where questioned the theory and doctrine underlying this right. See generally 
INAZU, supra note 3; John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional 
Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010); John D. Inazu, The Unset-
tling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 
(2010). 
 20. See generally INAZU, supra note 3 (discussing historical protections of 
the right of assembly).   
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sociation.21 The Court granted heightened protection to inti-
mate and (to a lesser degree) expressive associations, but only 
rational basis protection to non-intimate, non-expressive asso-
ciations.22 As a result, some groups that might have received 
constitutional protection under the right of assembly, or even 
under the initial version of the right of association, are now no 
longer protected.23  
Suppose we sought to eliminate the threshold Roberts in-
quiries into intimacy and expressiveness. Would this kind of 
rights expansion lead to Hamburger’s “more is less” concern by 
weakening the core of the right? Expanding the coverage of the 
right beyond its current baseline to include a larger number of 
groups (including non-intimate, non-expressive groups) would 
require more interest balancing for more groups.24 But the cur-
rent baseline already requires a balancing of interests for those 
groups that fall within the protections of the right.25 Eliminat-
ing the intimate and expressive thresholds would mean that an 
expanded class of rights-holders could benefit from the protec-
tions of the right. Surely some groups unprotected under the 
Roberts baseline would benefit from heightened protection if we 
shifted the level of judicial review for restrictions affecting the-
se groups from rational basis scrutiny to something like strict 
scrutiny. 
Expanding the coverage of the right of association would 
also make the doctrinal test clearer and less subject to manipu-
lation. The current intimacy and expressiveness determina-
tions introduce countless subjective and ideologically charged 
judgments—the kinds of inquiries most suspect under the First 
 
 21. 468 U.S. 609, 617–22 (1984).   
 22. Id.   
 23. See INAZU, supra note 3, at 136. I have offered real and hypothetical 
examples of such groups in other writing. See id. at 3 (gay social club, prayer 
or meditation group, and college fraternity). See generally John D. Inazu, su-
pra note 16 (hypothetical “St. Louis Beer Lovers” club, online forum for par-
ents, motorcycle club, fight club, and nudist colony). 
 24. I assume that courts engage in “balancing” irrespective of the level of 
scrutiny employed. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
583 (1978) (strict scrutiny also involves a kind of balancing); Pierre J. Schlag, 
An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
671 (1983).    
 25. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (concluding that the state’s interest 
in eradicating gender discrimination outweighs a private group’s right to ex-
pressive association).   
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Amendment.26 Rights expansion might lead to greater public 
confidence in the right of association. Or, at the very least, 
there is nothing to suggest that rights expansion is the wrong 
approach to strengthening that right.  
This Article explores the choice between rights expansion 
and rights confinement and the significance of cultural views 
on that choice, focusing on the rights of free exercise, speech, 
and association.27 Part I describes the preference for rights con-
finement in First Amendment scholarship. Part II critiques 
Hamburger’s “more is less” claim in the free exercise context 
and suggests that although Hamburger correctly diagnoses a 
weakening of the free exercise right, he fails to establish rights 
expansion as its cause. Parts III and IV offer an alternative ex-
planation for the weakened free exercise right: shifting cultural 
views about religious liberty and the government interests with 
which the free exercise right intersects. Part V discusses rights 
expansion for the rights of speech and association. Part VI con-
siders the implications of rights expansion for a contemporary 
constitutional challenge: private, noncommercial groups that 
resist antidiscrimination norms. 
I.  RIGHTS CONFINEMENT   
The intuition for rights confinement—the view that legal 
doctrine will be most resilient to cultural pressures when it is 
construed narrowly—is reflected in Vincent Blasi’s argument 
that the “pathological” First Amendment “should be targeted 
for the worst of times.”28 Blasi sought “to equip the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to do maximum service in those historical peri-
ods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and 
when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dis-
sent systematically.”29 He believed that the best way—and per-
haps the only way—to strengthen the First Amendment in an-
ticipation of these pressure periods is to ensure that “the 
appeal to constitutionalism evokes genuine sentiments of long-
term commitment or aspiration.”30 The challenge is all the more 
 
 26. Consider, for example, the fiercely contested arguments from the ma-
jority and the dissent in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), as 
to whether the Boy Scouts’ policy on homosexuality was sufficiently tied to its 
expressive association.  
 27. Although it is possible to direct the inquiry beyond the First Amend-
ment, I do not do so here.   
 28. Blasi, supra note 1, at 450.   
 29. Id. at 449–50. 
 30. Id. at 453. 
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important because “[t]he aggressive impulse to be intolerant of 
others resides within all of us.”31  
Blasi developed his pathological perspective with an eye 
toward historical episodes like the Red Scare.32 His worries also 
encompass other forms of resistance to prevailing orthodoxies.33 
The pathologies that threaten the First Amendment need not 
manifest through intense or clearly defined instances of politi-
cal hostility; just as often, political suppression unfolds through 
more sustained and less direct forms of intolerance.  
Blasi briefly considered the possibility of rights expansion 
as a protection against the pathological First Amendment.34 He 
noted the “intriguing and difficult question, well worth pausing 
over, whether adoption of the pathological perspective should 
lead courts to favor an expansive or a narrowly confined but 
heavily fortified set of [F]irst [A]mendment principles.”35 But 
Blasi’s insights do not inevitably counsel against rights expan-
sion because he writes at the level of cultural views, not legal 
 
 31. Id. at 457. 
 32. Id. at 456–58, 464–65; see id. at 462 (“My claim is that the most seri-
ous threats to the core commitments of the [F]irst [A]mendment tend to be 
concentrated in unusual, intense periods and tend to derive from certain pow-
erful social dynamics.”). 
 33. See generally Blasi, supra note 1 (arguing that “the overriding objec-
tive at all times should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum ser-
vice in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most 
prevalent”). 
 34. Id. at 477. The possibility of rights expansion can also be seen in Pro-
fessor Karst’s article on the right of intimate association. See Karst, supra 
note 2. Karst warned in a footnote that “[t]he danger of [stretching the right of 
association] is that First Amendment doctrine would become encumbered with 
new limits and exceptions, because some claims inevitably would be rejected” 
and “[f]rom these decisions a doctrinal infection would spread, touching even 
traditional First Amendment concerns.” Id. at 654–55 n.140. Read in isolation, 
Karst’s footnote looks like a caution against rights expansion in the context of 
the right of intimate association. But Karst’s larger point was exactly the op-
posite; he wanted a flexible and capacious doctrine of intimate association that 
would extend beyond even expressive limits. See id. at 654. Karst’s capacious 
interpretation of intimate association is evident when he recognizes the need 
to protect casual as well as committed sexual relationships. See id. at 633, 688. 
 35. Blasi, supra note 1, at 477. Although Blasi recognized “certain ad-
vantages” to a rights-expansive approach, he ultimately decided against it. Id. 
Here, however, it is important to highlight that Blasi rejected rights expansion 
on the assumption that the First Amendment would “be construed expansively 
in normal times so as to provide judges with fodder for concessions that might 
be demanded by insistent political forces in pathological periods.” Id. at 478. 
In other words, Blasi shied away from an instrumental expansion of First 
Amendment coverage that would artificially inflate its reach only to be used as 
a bargaining chip against future challenges. 
INAZU_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:44 PM 
492 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:485 
 
doctrine.36 As he notes, “[t]he defining feature of a pathological 
period is a shift in basic attitudes, among certain influential ac-
tors if not the public at large, concerning the desirability of the 
central norms of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”37 The key to guard-
ing against a pathological shift is “to promote an attitude of re-
spect, devotion, perhaps even reverence, regarding those [First 
Amendment] norms.”38 Toward this end, “the bench can serve 
as a pulpit.”39 These passages are not wooden doctrinal argu-
ments. They are focused on cultural views about First Amend-
ment norms.40  
Blasi also worried that “[t]he wider the reach of [F]irst 
[A]mendment coverage, the greater seems to be the judicial af-
finity for instrumental reasoning, balancing tests, differential 
levels of scrutiny, and pragmatic judgments.”41 Given that the 
current state of First Amendment jurisprudence already re-
flects this balancing malaise, Blasi’s normative prescriptions 
may no longer counsel against rights expansion. As he sug-
gests, one of the key insights is that “simple precepts can have 
a strong intuitive appeal, and it is just that kind of emotional 
force that may be most effective in reversing or containing the 
dangerous attitude shifts that take place in pathological peri-
 
 36. See id. at 466; see also id. at 482 (“Shifts in attitudes regarding the 
moral imperative of tolerance are especially important in times of patholo-
gy . . . .”); id. at 483–84 (“Concern about the dynamics of legitimation in patho-
logical periods also explains why the natural, and indeed often rational, social 
impulse to enforce canons of good taste must not be permitted to serve as a 
justification for speech regulation.”).  
 37. Id. at 467; see also Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 307 (1981) (“The risk 
of misapplication of a general category of coverage leads us to define the cate-
gory of coverage as broadly as possible, indeed somewhat more broadly than 
any underlying theory of free speech would warrant.”). 
 38. Blasi, supra note 1, at 467.  
 39. Id.  
 40. In Blasi’s words, “[t]he wellsprings of political authority are culturally 
dependent and often mysterious.” Id. at 453. I have described a similar process 
in John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 
21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335 (2013). See also RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, 
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 258 
(1984) (“The legitimacy of law in a democratic society depends upon the popu-
lar recognition of the connections between law and what people think life is 
and ought to be.”); Douglas NeJaime, Doctrine in Context, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 10, 18 (2013) (arguing, in the context of efforts to constitutionalize gay mar-
riage, that “doctrinal concepts . . . serve as a mobilizing tool, channel political 
support, and furnish justifications for lower courts”).  
 41. Blasi, supra note 1, at 479.  
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ods.”42 It may be that rights expansion can lead to greater clari-
ty and simplicity of doctrine. Part V of this Article suggests just 
that possibility; we may indeed strengthen doctrinal clarity by 
expanding the right of association. Before turning to the possi-
bility of rights expansion, I explain in greater detail why its 
critics have overstated their case. 
II.  HAMBURGER’S “MORE IS LESS” ARGUMENT   
Hamburger draws upon Blasi’s insights to caution against 
rights expansion.43 Although Hamburger applies his “more is 
less” argument to a variety of contexts, I focus here on his ex-
ample of the free exercise right.44 Hamburger makes a baseline 
claim, a contemporary claim, and a causal claim.  
Hamburger’s baseline claim reflects what he views as the 
“core” of the free exercise right. He argues that the core initial-
ly protected religious belief and conduct against all discrimina-
tory laws that singled out religion for penalty.45 These protec-
tions of the free exercise right were “unconditional” and 
“without qualification,” such that they always prevailed over 
discriminatory laws.46 That baseline, embodied in the First 
Amendment, “provides a benchmark for observing how more 
became less.”47 
 
 42. Id. at 472. 
 43. See Hamburger, supra note 2, at 837 (“Blasi observes that rights can 
become politically vulnerable when interpreted expansively.”); id. at 885–86 
(“As Vincent Blasi points out, the freedom of speech and press has expanded 
far beyond its core, and this enlargement tends to undermine the capacity of 
the First Amendment to preserve the freedom of speech and press in the very 
situations in which the Amendment’s guarantees are most needed.”).  
 44. Hamburger’s free exercise claim marks the first application of the 
“more is less” thesis and forms the basis for expanding the thesis to later ap-
plications. See id. at 837 (“[T]he contingency of the free exercise of religion 
raises a more general question as to whether the definition of any right can be 
expanded without risking access to the right.”).  
 45. See id. at 853.  
 46. See id. at 853, 855; see also id. at 855 (comparing the “unconditional” 
free exercise right in the First Amendment to conditional free exercise protec-
tions in state constitutions); id. at 857 (“The First Amendment thus guaran-
teed a sort of religious liberty that did not seem to threaten government inter-
ests and that therefore could be unconditional—indeed, utterly 
unqualified. . . . Accordingly, [Americans] were able to protect religious liberty 
without qualification—without any condition, interpretation, or other measure 
in terms of government interests.”); id. at 860 (“[T]he free exercise of religion 
was the one freedom that supposedly could not in any way be sacrificed to the 
interests of civil society or government.”). 
 47. Id. at 849; see also id. at 853 (describing the First Amendment as “the 
foundation for observing how more became less”).   
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Hamburger’s contemporary claim is that the free exercise 
right now protects religious belief and conduct only from some 
discriminatory laws that single out religion for penalty.48 In-
stead of providing absolute protections from discriminatory 
laws, courts now subject all free exercise claims to a form of in-
terest balancing that leads to weaker protections for the core of 
the right.49  
Hamburger’s causal claim is that the weakening of the free 
exercise right occurred as a result of advocacy for rights expan-
sion in the middle of the twentieth century.50 By his account, 
proponents of religious liberty who sought to have the free ex-
ercise right cover religious exemptions from generally applica-
ble laws also argued that religious liberty protections were con-
tingent rather than absolute.51 The Supreme Court responded 
with interest balancing for the entire right; as Hamburger put 
it, “[t]he expansion of the First Amendment right of free exer-
cise has undermined its core.”52 Rights expansion backfired; 
“more is less” because the contemporary free exercise right is 
less protective than its historical baseline as a result of the ad-
vocacy for rights expansion.53 In the following pages, I disagree 
with Hamburger’s baseline and causal claims but agree with 
part of his contemporary claim. I begin with the baseline claim.  
A. THE BASELINE CLAIM 
Hamburger’s baseline claim represents his view of the 
scope and strength of the free exercise right in the late eight-
eenth century. His claim is worth quoting at length: 
Early Americans were able to adopt constitutions that guaranteed re-
ligious liberty without conditions or even other qualifications because 
they defined this freedom in ways compatible with government inter-
 
 48. See id. at 876–77. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. at 875. 
 51. Id. at 869 (“For more than half a century, growing numbers of Ameri-
cans have argued for religious exemptions from general laws, and in defense of 
their expanded conception of the free exercise of religion, they have argued 
that this liberty is contingent—that it is unavailable where it conflicts with 
compelling government interests.”); id. at 875 (“[T]wentieth-century Ameri-
cans redefined the free exercise of religion to include a right of exemption from 
general laws . . . .”).   
 52. Id. at 874. 
 53. Cf. id. at 882 (“Consequentially, as the First Amendment’s right of 
free exercise has expanded to include a right of exemption, the central freedom 
from penalties has come to seem conditional upon governmental interests. The 
periphery has required a reconceptualization of the core.”). 
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ests. Americans would later expand the definition of their religious 
liberty and would thereby render this freedom conditional. In the late 
eighteenth century, however, Americans had some definitions of reli-
gious liberty that did not threaten government interests, and on these 
foundations, in several of their constitutions, including the U.S. Con-
stitution, they protected religious liberty without any qualification.54 
Hamburger relies heavily on James Madison’s Memorial 
and Remonstrance to establish his baseline claim.55 In that 
1785 document, Madison famously asserted that free exercise 
was an “unalienable right” that may not be “abridged by the in-
stitution of Civil Society.”56 Hamburger uses this language to 
suggest that Madison understood the free exercise of religion to 
be “utterly unconditional.”57 But nine years earlier, during the 
debates of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, Madison proposed 
limiting free exercise if “under color of religion the preservation 
of equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly 
endangered.”58 And in 1822, Madison wrote to Edward Living-
ston that free exercise should prevail “in every case where it 
does not trespass on private rights or the public peace.”59 A lit-
eral reading of Madison’s political rhetoric in Memorial and 
Remonstrance is incompatible with the constitutional language 
that he proposed in Virginia in 1776 and the pragmatic reflec-
tions that he offered in 1822. Hamburger gives us little reason 
 
 54. Id. at 848. 
 55. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS (June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
295, 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). Hamburger’s other sources are 
less influential than Madison. See Hamburger, supra note 2, at 841–42 (quot-
ing the English dissenter Philip Furneaux); id. at 843–44 (quoting David 
Thomas); id. at 847 (quoting Theophilus Parsons); id. at 848 (quoting Samuel 
Stillman). By critiquing the weight of these sources, I do not mean to ascribe 
to Hamburger an originalist or “original public meaning” method of constitu-
tional interpretation. But to the extent that Hamburger’s interpretive argu-
ment rests on something akin to popular understandings at the Framing, the 
evidence that he musters is not persuasive.   
 56. MADISON, supra note 55, at 299. 
 57. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 835; see also id. at 844–45 (quoting and 
discussing Madison’s understanding of the free exercise of religion); id. at 846 
(quoting Madison). 
 58. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1463 (1990) (quoting S. 
COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 492 (1902)).   
 59. Id. at 1464 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston 
(July 10, 1822), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (G. 
Hunt ed., 1901)). McConnell argues that “[t]his indicates that [Madison be-
lieved] a believer has no license to invade the private rights of others or to dis-
turb public peace and order, no matter how conscientious the belief or how 
trivial the private right on the other side.” Id. 
INAZU_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:44 PM 
496 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:485 
 
to believe that Madison radically modified his views in the in-
terim, only to revert back to his earlier position.60 
Even more problematic to Hamburger’s story is that the 
little we do know of the early free exercise clause did not reflect 
absolute protection from discriminatory laws. Consider Davis v. 
Beason, an 1890 decision that arose well before the mid-
twentieth century advocacy for exemptions that anchors Ham-
burger’s causal claim.61 The blatantly anti-Mormon statute in 
Davis reached speech and association as well as “conduct.”62 Its 
discriminatory restrictions included prohibitions against teach-
ing, advising, counseling, or encouraging the practices of biga-
my and polygamy, or being a member of any association that 
taught these practices. Far from being a neutral law of general 
applicability, the statute in Davis explicitly targeted, among 
other things, the Mormon practice of “celestial marriage.”63  
The Supreme Court upheld the law in its entirety, conclud-
ing that “[h]owever free the exercise of religion may be, it must 
 
 60. Hamburger’s interpretation of Madison’s views on this point is partic-
ularly vulnerable. He explains Madison’s qualifying language in the 1776 Vir-
ginia debates by suggesting that “[n]otwithstanding his willingness to com-
promise on conditions and even to manipulate them to his ends, it is probable 
on the basis of his slightly later writings that he ideally wanted no conditions.” 
Hamburger, supra note 2, at 845 n.27. Then he threads the needle in the other 
direction by suggesting that the 1822 correspondence reveals that: “Madison 
seems to have commended governmental limits on religious liberty only in the 
nineteenth century, when he became increasingly suspicious of religious or-
ganizations, their power, and their hierarchies.” Id. It may well be that Madi-
son’s tolerance for governmental limits grew over time, but Hamburger’s the-
sis is that Madison embraced an absolute free exercise right as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine at the framing of the First Amendment. A more plausi-
ble argument is that Madison consistently recognized some qualifications for 
the free exercise right.  
 61. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). See also Late Corp. of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 
(1890) (upholding the revocation of the church’s corporate charter). 
 62. Davis, 133 U.S. at 133. The statute provided:  
[N]o . . . person who is a bigamist or polygamist or who teaches, ad-
vises, counsels, or encourages any person or persons to become biga-
mists or polygamists, or to commit any other crime defined by law, or 
to enter into what is known as plural or celestial marriage, or who is 
a member of any order, organization or association which teaches, ad-
vises, counsels, or encourages its members or devotees or any other 
persons to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other 
crime defined by law, either as a rite or ceremony of such order, or-
ganization, or association or otherwise, is permitted to vote at any 
election, or to hold any position or office of honor, trust, or profit with-
in this Territory. 
Id. at 346–47 (quoting § 501 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho Territory). 
 63. Id.    
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be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with 
reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly 
the subjects of punitive legislation.”64 The Court elaborated, 
discussing prohibitions on certain forms of marriage and hu-
man sacrifice: 
Should a sect of either of these kinds ever find its way into this coun-
try, swift punishment would follow the carrying into effect of its doc-
trines, and no heed would be given to the pretence that, as religious 
beliefs, their supporters could be protected in their exercise by the 
Constitution of the United States.65 
Davis and its reasoning place considerable strain on Hamburg-
er’s claim that the free exercise right provided an absolute pro-
tection against discriminatory laws prior to the mid-twentieth 
century.66  
The historical flaws with Hamburger’s account gesture to-
ward a more fundamental problem with his baseline claim; the 
absolute and unconditional free exercise right never existed be-
cause the state is incapable of recognizing such a right. There 
will always be consensus norms that trump the exercise of any 
right. As Peter de Marneffe has observed: 
Some may think of rights as “absolute,” believing that to say that 
there is a right to some liberty is to say that the government may not 
interfere with this liberty for any reason. But if this is how rights are 
understood, there are virtually no rights to liberty—because for vir-
 
 64. Id. at 342–43.  
 65. Id. at 343. The Court continued:  
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been seri-
ously contended that the whole punitive power of the government for 
acts, recognized by the general consent of the Christian world in mod-
ern times as proper matters for prohibitory legislation, must be sus-
pended in order that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime 
may be carried out without hindrance. 
Id.   
 66. There may also be normative problems with Hamburger’s characteri-
zation of the “unconditional” free exercise right as one that is “compatible with 
government interests” and which does “not threaten government interests.” 
Hamburger, supra note 2, at 848. As a threshold matter, it is not clear how 
this description makes the right unconditional. On Hamburger’s account, reli-
gious liberty’s compatibility with government interests was factored into “the 
justification and meta-analysis” of the First Amendment. Id. at 862. That 
merely shifts the conditioning of the free exercise right to an earlier stage of 
the analysis. It may be that this constitutional arrangement reflects an insti-
tutional preference for legislative rather than judicial balancing, but that does 
not make the free exercise right unconditional. Another normative problem is 
that it is not clear why we would care about a right, enforceable against the 
government, that was fully compatible with government interests and never 
threatened those interests. What would that right protect against? 
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tually every liberty there will be some morally sufficient reason for 
the government to interfere with it.67  
These realist insights have always provided practical limits to 
civil liberties, including the free exercise clause.68 
B. THE CONTEMPORARY CLAIM 
Hamburger’s contemporary claim is that the free exercise 
right has moved from “the most inalienable and unqualified of 
rights” to one that has “come to seem contingent on the con-
cerns of government.”69 His particular worry is that today “gov-
ernment can ‘burden’ the free exercise of religion, if it does so 
on the basis of a compelling interest.”70 In other words, Ham-
burger views the move from absolute protection to strict scruti-
ny review as the key doctrinal disintegration of the free exer-
cise right. He locates part of that change in the 1960s 
exemption cases,71 and sees the culmination in the Court’s 1990 
decision, Employment Division v. Smith.72 
Smith also introduced another significant doctrinal change 
in free exercise law: the move from strict scrutiny to rational 
basis scrutiny for claims challenging generally applicable 
 
 67. Peter de Marneffe, Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association, in 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 145, 146 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); cf. STANLEY 
FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 
104 (1994) (“Speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself but is always 
produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the good to 
which it must yield in the event of conflict.”).   
 68. The use of tiered scrutiny in First Amendment analysis offers a par-
tial protection against state regulation for expressive activity that triggers 
strict scrutiny review. But even here, standards akin to strict scrutiny have 
failed to protect expressive activity. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–24 (2010) (applying an elevated level of scrutiny 
to a freedom of association claim); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–
29 (1984) (rejecting freedom of association claim under elevated scrutiny). The 
problems of “balancing” under strict scrutiny were perhaps most evident in 
cases that the Supreme Court decided in the waning years of the Second Red 
Scare. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 69. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 858. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 858–59 (discussing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). 
 72. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 877 (asserting that Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), “took a further step toward imposing the compelling gov-
ernment interest test on the core freedom from discriminatory legal con-
straints”). 
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laws.73 That aspect of Smith is widely viewed as substantially 
weakening the protections of the free exercise right.74 In fact, 
its doctrinal implications are so striking that the Supreme 
Court has subsequently sought to limit them.75  
Hamburger focuses on a narrower dimension of the deci-
sion: “[T]he Court in Smith took a further step toward imposing 
the compelling government interest test on the core freedom 
from discriminatory legal constraints.”76 Even though “Smith 
largely rejected claims of exemption [reflected in its move from 
strict scrutiny to rational basis scrutiny], it left in place the 
conditions developed in exemption cases, and it thereby sug-
gested that such conditions applied even in cases not involving 
exemptions.”77 In other words, Hamburger’s concern in Smith is 
not about the move to rational basis scrutiny for nondiscrimi-
natory laws but about the suggestion that claims against dis-
criminatory laws would be subject to strict scrutiny instead of 
absolute protection: “Smith confirmed earlier hints of what 
would become an extraordinary irony. Compelling government 
interest had been introduced in exemption cases as a condition 
on claims against non-discriminatory laws. Now, however, such 
an interest became a condition on the most central free exercise 
 
 73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–91 (rejecting strict scrutiny review for free ex-
ercise challenge to neutral laws of general applicability). Compare Sherbert, 
374 U.S. at 398 (applying strict scrutiny in free exercise claim), with Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219–29 (1972) (same). In response to Smith, Con-
gress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). Pub. L. 
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2010)). The RFRA ensured strict scrutiny review of laws or regula-
tions that substantially burdened the free exercise of religion. Id. But as Adam 
Winkler has shown, strict scrutiny review brought under the RFRA has been 
far less likely to invalidate a law or regulation than constitutionally based 
strict scrutiny. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
858–62 (2006).  
 74. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (finding that Smith “virtually elimi-
nated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exer-
cise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”).   
 75. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701 (2012) (noting that Smith in-
volved government regulation of “only outward physical acts” while church 
hiring decisions were “internal church decision[s]”); Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–46 (1993) (applying 
strict scrutiny because challenged ordinances were neither neutral nor gener-
ally applicable).  
 76. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 877. 
 77. Id. 
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claims—those against discriminatory legal constraints.”78 
Hamburger’s key example of the implications of Smith is 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.79 In 
Lukumi, the Court distinguished discriminatory laws that tar-
geted religion from generally applicable laws like the one in 
Smith.80 The Court held that the former kinds of laws would be 
subject to strict scrutiny review rather than the rational basis 
review accorded neutral laws of general applicability.81 Some 
advocates of religious liberty view Lukumi as a partial mitiga-
tion of the damage done by Smith.82 Hamburger sees the case 
as symptomatic of a “more is less” concern: “[I]n Lukumi, the 
Court protected this ‘essential’ free exercise freedom from reli-
gious penalties only after weighing it against government in-
terests. In this way, the compelling government interest condi-
tion, which once limited and justified claims of exemption 
against nondiscriminatory laws, now seemed to bar more fun-
damental claims against penalties.”83 For this reason, “the con-
ditional character of the right of exemption has spread to the 
more basic freedom from penalties on religion.”84  
There are two problems with Hamburger’s focus on 
Lukumi. The first problem, which I argued in the previous sec-
tion, is that the free exercise right was never absolute in the 
way that Hamburger suggests; the government could always 
trump a free exercise claim with a sufficiently compelling in-
terest. That is the lesson from Davis v. Beason.85 The second 
 
 78. Id. at 878–79. 
 79. Id. At 879; see Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520. 
 80. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is 
not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of 
scrutiny.”). Lukumi involved a Santerian church that was expanding into Hia-
leah, Florida. Id. at 525–26. The Church practiced animal sacrifice. Id. at 526. 
In response, the Hialeah city council called an “emergency” public meeting. Id. 
After this meeting, the council adopted a number of ordinances to prevent 
“ritual” sacrifices. Id. at 526–27. 
 81. Id. at 531. 
 82. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free 
Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 850 (2001). 
 83. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 881. 
 84. Id. at 882. 
 85. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1890) (“With man’s relations 
to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in 
which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no 
interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to 
secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered 
with. However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to 
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problem is that the contemporary protections for the free exer-
cise right are far weaker because of the move from strict scru-
tiny to rational basis review, than they are from the purported 
transition from absolute protection to strict scrutiny review. 
Put differently, even though Hamburger is right to suggest that 
strict scrutiny review provides less than absolute protection, 
strict scrutiny is still pretty good protection. Rational basis 
scrutiny is not. 
C. THE CAUSAL CLAIM 
In the previous section, I intimated some agreement with 
Hamburger’s contemporary claim that there is “less” of a free 
exercise right today. But that descriptive claim leaves un-
addressed the causal claim that lies at the heart of Hamburg-
er’s “more is less” thesis: whether arguments for “more” of the 
right led to “less” protection. Specifically, Hamburger argues 
that the free exercise right is weaker today than its baseline 
protections because of advocacy to expand the scope of the pro-
tections of the right.86 He asserts that efforts to expand the free 
exercise right to include exemptions have meant that “the cen-
tral freedom from penalties has come to seem conditional upon 
government interests.”87  
It is important to emphasize that Hamburger’s causal 
claim only holds true if rights expansion results in a previously 
protected core receiving less stringent protection. It is not 
enough to show that religious liberty at the outer boundaries of 
newly expanded coverage is insufficiently or minimally protect-
ed. That liberty is no worse off—and perhaps better off—when 
conditioned on government interests, than if the coverage of the 
free exercise clause had never encompassed it in the first place.  
Hamburger claims that judicial review of free exercise ar-
guments has shifted from absolute protection to interest bal-
ancing.88 He acknowledges that “the costs of the expanded defi-
nition have been more conceptual than practical” but insists 
 
the criminal laws of the country.”). It is useful here to compare the anti-
Mormon restriction in Davis to the anti-Santerian restriction in Lukumi. In 
neither case did the government explicitly single out a particular religion in 
the text of the law. 
 86. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 837 (“[T]he conditions imposed during 
the last half of the twentieth century suggest how well-intentioned efforts to 
enlarge a right can inflate it so far as to weaken it.”). 
 87. Id. at 882. 
 88. Id. at 874.   
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that “the harms . . . are very real.”89 But he offers no example of 
a court denying free exercise protection under interest balanc-
ing to a previously protected religious belief or conduct.90 The 
closest he comes is to speculate that “it should come as no sur-
prise if Americans one day assimilate [the assumption of the 
conditional nature of religious liberty] so far as to endorse laws 
penalizing religion.”91 This prediction offers no actual support 
for the “more is less” thesis or for an indictment of rights ex-
pansion.92  
The closest example of a “more is less” concern may be the 
Smith decision, but in a way that differs from Hamburger’s ar-
gument. Recall that Hamburger is chiefly concerned with the 
Court’s move from an absolute free exercise right toward the 
compelling interest test.93 He speculates that introducing the 
compelling interest test to periphery cases has now spread to 
the core of the free exercise right.94 This test weakens and di-
minishes the core of the right by allowing government interests 
to trump rights that were once absolute.  
Justice Scalia’s Smith opinion expresses a parallel concern 
that leaving the compelling interest test intact would jeopard-
ize the core. Scalia, however, worries about a compelling inter-
est baseline: 
If the “compelling interest” test is to be applied at all, then, it must be 
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously com-
manded. Moreover, if “compelling interest” really means what it says 
(and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields 
where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society 
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger 
 
 89. Id. at 882. 
 90. Hamburger suggests that McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), evi-
dences “[t]he changing conception of even the core free exercise right” because 
the Court engaged in interest balancing. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 876–77. 
McDaniel invalidated a statute prohibiting “[M]inister[s] of the Gospel, or 
priest[s]” from participating in a state constitutional convention. McDaniel, 
435 U.S. at 618 (alteration in original). Given that the Court sided with the 
free exercise claimant, it is difficult to construe the decision as supporting the 
“more is less” thesis.   
 91. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 883. This quote is an example of what 
appears to be a cultural rather than a doctrinal claim by Hamburger. 
 92. Indeed, our constitutional common law regime often reflects an insti-
tutional preference for protecting the previously established core of a right. 
Subsequent cases that would seem to jeopardize the core will most often be 
distinguished on other grounds. I thank Tom Berg for this observation.   
 93. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 858.   
 94. Id. at 858–59. 
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increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious be-
liefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.95 
Scalia’s argument is that a broadly applicable compelling inter-
est test would either leave judges in the untenable position of 
“evaluating the merits of different religious claims”96 or “open 
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions 
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”97 He 
concludes that the shift to rational basis scrutiny avoids these 
two undesirable alternatives.98 
Although there is a sense in which Scalia’s argument re-
sembles Hamburger’s “more is less” concern, Scalia relies on 
the rationale prospectively, to avoid what Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence referred to as an unsubstantiated “parade of 
horribles.”99 Thus, like Hamburger’s speculative worry about 
the future, Scalia fails to establish an actual harm to the core of 
the free exercise right. Scalia’s pragmatic concern is rooted in 
his observation that “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of 
people of almost every conceivable religious preference.”100 
Whatever dynamism underlies that sociological description is 
independent of Hamburger’s causal claim. The litigants in 
Smith were not making a rights-expansive argument—they 
were relying on what they assumed was the governing compel-
ling interest test.101  
Hamburger’s thesis might have the most salience for the 
doctrine emerging out of two important cases decided after he 
published his article. The first is the Court’s 2012 decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, which recognized a “ministerial ex-
ception” rooted in the First Amendment’s free exercise and es-
 
 95. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).  
 96. Id. at 887 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 97. Id. at 888.   
 98. Id. at 889–90. 
 99. Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court’s parade of horribles 
not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test, it instead 
demonstrates just the opposite: that courts have been quite capable of apply-
ing our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between reli-
gious liberty and competing state interests.” (citation omitted)).   
 100. Id. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 606 (1961)). 
 101. See Brief for Petitioners at 5, Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
(No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126846 (“Under settled free exercise principles, the 
[F]irst [A]mendment protects religious actions as well as religious beliefs. 
However, that protection is not absolute. When government has a compelling 
interest in regulating conduct, religious actions must give way unless govern-
ment can accommodate the religious practice without compromising its inter-
est.”). 
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tablishment clauses.102 The unanimous decision made clear that 
the ministerial exception provided an absolute protection for 
churches to hire and fire ministers on whatever basis they 
would like.103 
 The Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor is deliberately 
narrow and leaves unresolved important definitional questions 
like what is a “church” and who is a “minister.”104 Some advo-
cates of religious liberty have sought to extend those categories 
even to “parachurch groups only loosely connected to an eccle-
siastical structure.”105 Carl Esbeck has warned that this litiga-
tion approach may backfire: “[T]hose who embrace [Hosanna-
Tabor] eagerly and then proceed to apply it where not intend-
ed” may “yield a series of lower court opinions seeming to cut 
back on Hosanna-Tabor, with all the attendant rhetoric about a 
‘clear and present danger’ of religion unregulated and out of 
 
 102. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012). 
 103. Id. at 709 (“The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s 
decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The ex-
ception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will min-
ister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone.” 
(citations omitted)); see also id. at 703 (“By forbidding the ‘establishment of 
religion’ and guaranteeing the ‘free exercise thereof,’ the Religion Clauses en-
sured that the new Federal Government—unlike the English Crown—would 
have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”); id. at 706 (“By imposing an un-
wanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects 
a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its ap-
pointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will 
minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohib-
its government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”); Michael W. 
McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 
836–37 (2012) (“Most of the initial reaction to Hosanna-Tabor was confined to 
its immediate context: the hiring and firing of ministers. To extend constitu-
tional protection to these quintessentially religious decisions seemed neces-
sary, and obviously correct. . . . But looking forward, it may be the broader 
doctrinal implications of Hosanna-Tabor that have the most lasting signifi-
cance. It is not too much to say that the decision augurs a ‘new birth of free-
dom’ for the religious communities of America.”).    
 104. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (“We are reluctant . . . to adopt a 
rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is 
enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial ex-
ception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her 
employment.”). 
 105. MARK A. NOLL & CAROLYN NYSTROM, IS THE REFORMATION OVER? AN 
EVANGELICAL ASSESSMENT OF CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLICISM 85–86 
(2005).   
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control.”106 If Esbeck’s warning is correct—and it may well be—
then we could see a concrete example of the “more is less” ar-
gument: a baseline absolute protection weakened at the core as 
a result of advocacy to expand the protection.  
The second plausible example of a “more is less” phenome-
non—albeit a prospective one—relates to the recent resurgence 
of interest in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
surrounding litigation against the contraceptive mandate un-
der the Affordable Care Act.107 Although Hamburger confines 
his “more is less” argument to constitutional rather than statu-
tory expansions, the statutory example may pose a more strik-
ing possibility of “more is less.” That possibility might be set up 
by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lob-
by Stores, which held that RFRA protected closely held corpora-
tions from substantial burdens on religious exercise.108 Writing 
for the majority of a sharply divided Court, Justice Alito argued 
that: (1) RFRA expanded the scope of religious liberty protec-
tions from the pre-Smith standard; and (2) an amendment to 
RFRA in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA) either reinforced or expanded RFRA’s expan-
sion.109 
If Justice Alito is correct, then either the original or 
amended versions of RFRA could satisfy the “more” predicate of 
Hamburger’s thesis. That, in turn, could lead to judicial or 
statutory retrenchment.110 If future litigants who would have 
 
 106. Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of 
Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 114, 
118 (2012).   
 107. The relevant issues and history are set forth in Burwell v. Hobby Lob-
by Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014). 
 108. Id., slip op. at 1–2. 
 109. Id., slip op. at 25–26 (“[N]othing in the text of RFRA as originally en-
acted suggested that the statutory phrase ‘exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment’ was meant to be tied to this Court’s pre-Smith interpretation of 
that Amendment. When first enacted, RFRA defined the ‘exercise of religion’ 
to mean ‘the exercise of religion under the First Amendment’—not the exercise 
of religion as recognized only by then-existing Supreme Court precedents. . . . 
[I]f the original text of RFRA was not clear enough on this point—and we 
think it was—the amendment of RFRA through RLUIPA surely dispels any 
doubt. That amendment deleted the prior reference to the First Amend-
ment . . . .”).  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent disagreed with both of these interpre-
tations. Id., slip op. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 110. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Confirms That 
RFRA Is Extreme Religious Liberty, CAMBRIDGE BLOG (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2014/06/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-confirms-that 
-rfra-is-extreme-religious-liberty (“RFRA is an extreme standard that per-
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been protected under the pre-Smith free exercise standard 
start to lose claims brought under the expanded RFRA stand-
ard, then we may have “less.” In both RFRA and the ministeri-
al exception, more could be less.111 But more is not necessarily 
less. 
III.  CULTURAL VIEWS ABOUT THE FREE EXERCISE 
RIGHT   
The preceding section questioned Hamburger’s baseline 
and causal claims about the free exercise right. However, it as-
serted that a portion of the contemporary claim is correct—the 
free exercise right has weakened from an earlier era. I have ar-
gued that these changes are not attributable to rights expan-
sion. Identifying an alternative explanation is a more difficult 
task. In this section, I suggest that one reason is attributable to 
shifting cultural views about the free exercise right. In the next 
section, I suggest a different reason rooted in the governmental 
interests with which the free exercise right intersects.  
One partial explanation for the weakening of the free exer-
cise right involves increased cultural opposition to religious lib-
erty claims. Cultural resistance to a right can increase in at 
least two ways. First, fewer people may benefit from or see the 
value of the right. Second, the exercise of the right might impli-
cate a broader (or different) class of government interests. The-
se alternatives are seemingly at odds with one another; the 
former suggests a decline in the scope of the right, whereas the 
latter appears to enlarge the degree to which the right conflicts 
with government interests. But it is possible that both can oc-
cur at the same time, and the free exercise right may reflect 
this convergence. Cultural resistance to the free exercise right 
may have increased because fewer people today actively seek 
its protections.112 At the same time, cultural resistance can in-
 
suaded a Congress in 1993 that did not do its homework to follow along. The 
time has come to repeal RFRA and to restore the country to common sense re-
ligious liberty under the First Amendment.”).  
 111. Even if more is less, the core of the ministerial exception set forth in 
Hosanna-Tabor is unlikely to be substantially eroded. Short of a wholesale re-
jection of the ministerial exception, the Court is unlikely to hold that the 
Catholic Church has to accept female priests, or that the state has a role to 
play in the selection of an imam at a mosque.   
 112. See, e.g., Americans Concerned About Religious Freedom, BARNA 
GROUP (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.barna.org/barna-update/culture/601-most 
-americans-are-concerned-about-restrictions-in-religious-freedom (finding that 
younger Americans are “much less concerned about religious liberty issues”). 
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crease if the existing beneficiaries of the free exercise right at-
tempt to expand its coverage into new areas. I turn first to the 
question of cultural resistance. 
A. DIMINISHED SALIENCE OF THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHT 
One potential explanation for diminished religious liberty 
protections is a decline in popular support for the underlying 
free exercise right. To be sure, most Americans continue to val-
ue religion and religious liberty in the most general sense.113 
But there is also a sense in which fewer people today recognize 
the immediate and practical need of the free exercise right. The 
primary reason for this change is that many past challenges to 
religious liberty are no longer active threats.114 We do not en-
force blasphemy laws.115 We do not force people to make com-
pelled statements of belief.116 We do not impose taxes to support 
the training of ministers.117 These changes may mean that as a 
practical matter, many Americans no longer depend upon the 
free exercise right for their religious liberty. They are free to 
practice their religion without government constraints and are 
therefore secure beneficiaries of the right. The clearest example 
of a secure beneficiary—the least threatened religious believer 
in America today—is the progressively oriented Christian, who 
at once remains a part of the dominant historical and cultural 
faith in the United States but whose political views are aligned 
with contemporary liberal values.118 It is hard to think of many 
 
 113. See, e.g., id. (“Nine out of 10 Americans (90%) agreed with the state-
ment, ‘True religious freedom means all citizens must have freedom of con-
science, which means being able to believe and practice the core commitments 
and values of your faith.’”); cf. Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious 
Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 772 (2013) (“Religious freedom is one thing near-
ly all Americans, left and right, religious and secular, have been able to agree 
upon, perhaps because it protects all of us.”). 
 114. Professor Laycock makes a related observation that “religious liberty 
has led to such a reduction in the level of religious conflict, at least in the 
United States, that religious conflict no longer seems very fearsome.” See 
Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 407, 424 (2011). For this reason, it might be that “religious lib-
erty in America is a victim of its own success.” Id. 
 115. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9–16 (1947) (discussing early 
colonial practices). 
 116. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
 117. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (“No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”). 
 118. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE 
RELATIONS 1 (2009). Progressive Christians usually fall on the “left” side of 
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aspects of progressive Christian belief and practice that 
“threaten government interests” in a way that implicates reli-
gious liberty.119  
In addition to secure beneficiaries, a growing number of 
Americans who are either actually or functionally non-religious 
may have no need for free exercise protections.120 They are non-
beneficiaries of the free exercise right. The number of non-
beneficiaries in the United States is still relatively small, but it 
is not insignificant, and it is growing steadily.121 More im-
portantly, the class of non-beneficiaries has moved from almost 
imperceptible (at the framing of the free exercise right) to socio-
logically significant;122 it is no longer possible to ignore nonbe-
lievers in framing normative and legal religious liberty argu-
ments, particularly in cases implicating the Establishment 
 
the political spectrum, and representative issues may include abortion, gay 
marriage, and gender equality. 
 119. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 848. I do not mean by this claim to sug-
gest that progressive Christians hold no views antithetical to government in-
terests. For example, many elements of the “religious left” challenge American 
policy on war, criminal law, immigration, or the environment. See, e.g., JASON 
C. BIVINS, THE FRACTURE OF GOOD ORDER: CHRISTIAN ANTILIBERALISM AND 
THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN POLITICS 2–3 (2003); SHIFFRIN, supra note 118, 
at 123. But most of these arguments pose few questions about the boundaries 
of free exercise—they are religiously informed policy arguments, not religious 
liberty arguments. Exceptions like peace activists arrested for civil disobedi-
ence prove the rule—the majority of progressive Christians do not fall into this 
category. See BIVINS, supra, at 30–31; see also Thomas C. Berg, Progressive 
Arguments for Religious Organizational Freedom: Reflections on the HHS 
Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 306 (2013) (discussing free exer-
cise arguments by progressive religious believers against “conceal-carry” laws 
and laws restricting assistance to illegal immigrants). In fact, it is difficult to 
think of actual circumstances in which secure beneficiaries of the free exercise 
right would need to enlist its protections, and the mostly likely circumstances 
would fall under strong statutory protections. See Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000) 
(providing strict scrutiny protection for religious liberty claims pertaining to 
land use and prisons).   
 120. Laycock suggests that this change alters the “original commitment to 
religious liberty,” which was “a sort of mutual non-aggression pact” in which 
“[a] right to free exercise of religion was a promise to everyone.” Laycock, su-
pra note 114, at 422.   
 121. Nelson Tebbe cites studies estimating that between four and five per-
cent of the population now identify as either atheist or agnostic. Nelson Tebbe, 
Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2011); see also Laycock, supra note 
114, at 420 (reporting that 12.3% of those polled in the American Religious 
Identification Survey answered “‘There is no such thing,’ ‘There is no way to 
know,’ or ‘I’m not sure’” when asked of the existence of God, and an additional 
12.1% answered “There is a higher power but no personal God.”). 
 122. See Laycock, supra note 114, at 419–20 (reporting the growth in the 
number of people that do not identify with any religion). 
INAZU_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:44 PM 
2014] MORE IS MORE 509 
 
Clause. That reality is nowhere more evident than in the grow-
ing recognition that even “nonsectarian” prayers are incapable 
of accommodating atheists.123 
Non-beneficiaries and secure beneficiaries may be less in-
clined to worry about the contested boundaries of the free exer-
cise right. They might view its outer limits as either unim-
portant or antithetical to other interests.124 As a result, cultural 
views about the importance of the free exercise right might 
weaken even as support for more generalized and abstract no-
tions of religious liberty remains high. Consider by way of 
analogy the Third Amendment.125 The constitutional provision 
that prevents the government from quartering soldiers in pri-
vate homes is an important and basic guarantee of our liber-
ties. But hardly anyone cares much about the Third Amend-
ment as a practical matter because few people worry about the 
government encroaching upon their freedom in this area.126 Re-
ligious freedom operates in a similar way for many citizens who 
do not experience an actual threat to their religious liberty. 
 
 123. See, e.g., Mike Meno, ‘Nonsectarian’ Prayer Still Alienates Nontheists, 
SECULAR COALITION FOR AMERICA (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.secular.org/ 
blogs/mike-meno/%E2%80%98nonsectarian%E2%80%99-prayer-still-alienates 
-nontheists. A majority of the Supreme Court seems to disagree, however. See 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1820 (2014). 
 124. Consider, for example, Eugene Volokh’s observation that the “key 
question of religious exemption law” is: “Why should my belief in what God 
commands me to do allow me to take something away from you, when you 
don’t share this belief?” Eugene Volokh, The Priority of Law: A Response to 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2013); see also Laycock, 
supra note 114, at 422 (“Many believers share the view that nonbelievers are 
not protected by guarantees of religious liberty, or at least not by important 
elements of those guarantees. By claiming religious liberty as a right only for 
themselves, they help confirm the nonbelievers’ view of religious liberty as just 
another special interest demand.”). 
 125. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but 
in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).  
 126. This point is aptly demonstrated in an “article” published on the paro-
dy website, The Onion. See Third Amendment Rights Group Celebrates Anoth-
er Successful Year, THE ONION (Oct. 5, 2007), http://www.theonion.com/ 
articles/third-amendment-rights-group-celebrates-another-su,2296 (“The Na-
tional Anti-Quartering Association, America’s foremost Third Amendment 
rights group, held its annual gala in Washington Monday to honor 191 consec-
utive years of advocating the protection of private homes and property against 
the unlawful boarding of military personnel. ‘This is a proud day for quarters-
owners everywhere,’ said the organization’s president, Charles Davison, in his 
keynote address. ‘Year after year, we have sent a loud and clear message to 
the federal government and to anyone else who would attack our unassailable 
rights: Hands off our cottages, livery stables, and haylofts.’”). 
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They may support religious freedom in the abstract but care lit-
tle about the disposition of actual free exercise claims.  
Non-beneficiaries and secure beneficiaries can of course 
continue to support a constitutional right. For example, even 
though the right to counsel does not directly benefit a citizen 
who has never needed a lawyer in a criminal proceeding, many 
people who have never been subject to criminal prosecution 
likely recognize the possibility that they or someone they know 
may one day need the protections of the right to counsel. To be 
sure, some citizens who have never affirmed religious belief 
will endorse the free exercise right for similar reasons. But this 
kind of empathy may not be true to the same extent for the free 
exercise right as it is for the right to counsel. It is at least plau-
sible to think that the potential need for the right to counsel is 
more appreciated by those who have never been arrested than 
the right to free exercise is by non-believers.127  
The growing number of non-beneficiaries and secure bene-
ficiaries who see little practical need for the free exercise right 
may distinguish that right from other First Amendment 
rights.128 Consider, by way of contrast, the free speech right. 
Most of us are quick to recognize robust speech protections be-
cause we think, almost intuitively, that we all benefit from 
speech protections. We may disagree over what counts as 
“speech” or whether certain forms of speech should be protect-
ed, but almost all of us believe that we are in some sense 
“speakers.” We all engage in the activity that the right protects. 
The free exercise right might be different. Even if we could 
agree about what counts as “religion” (or at least core instances 
of “religion”), a non-trivial number of Americans may claim 
 
 127. The salience of an “option” may not hold across all rights. For exam-
ple, because characteristics like race and gender are generally immutable and 
equal protection rights are seemingly limited to “discrete and insular minori-
ties,” white men may not perceive the need for the option of those rights. Cf. 
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 794 (2011) 
(“[E]qual protection claims tend to stress distinctions among us, even as they 
ask us to overcome those distinctions.”). On the other hand, the fact that white 
men have close relationships with citizens who are not white men might trig-
ger a kind of empathy for those benefiting from the right. Of course, one could 
make a similar argument about the relationships that many nonreligious citi-
zens have with religious citizens. These are empirical questions.   
 128. The one exception might be the press, depending upon how broadly or 
narrowly the scope of that right is construed today. See Paul Horwitz, Or of the 
[Blog], 11 NEXUS 45, 57 (2006).   
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that they are not “exercising religion” in a way that requires 
the protections of the free exercise clause.129 
Another plausible distinction between the free exercise 
right and the free speech right is that cases brought under the 
latter remain ideologically cross-cutting. Free speech plaintiffs 
are all over the ideological map: video gamers,130 anti-abortion 
counselors,131 labor unions,132 pornographers,133 and funeral pro-
testers134 all appeal to the free speech right. Most of us also en-
dorse Justice Black’s famous line that free speech protections 
“must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they 
will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”135 In contrast, most of 
the well-known contemporary free exercise challenges involve 
conservative religious believers, and many of those challenges 
are to government restrictions informed by liberal values.136 
The ideological leaning of the bulk of today’s free exercise 
plaintiffs may lead to increased skepticism about the value of 
free exercise rights from those who most often encounter them 
in the form of legal challenges to laws that they value.  
 
 129. However, secure beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of religious liberty 
protections may continue to derive meaningful structural protections from the 
establishment clause.   
 130. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732–33 (2011). 
 131. McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 172 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 132. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 133. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 238 (2002); Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100–01 (1974).   
 134. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214–15 (2011). 
 135. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he freedoms of 
speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment 
must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to 
the ideas we cherish.”). Note that Justice Black omits the free exercise of reli-
gion from his list of First Amendment rights.   
 136. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. June 
30, 2014) (dealing with Christian store owners challenging the inclusion of 
certain contraceptives in the Affordable Care Act); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012) (dealing with a Christian school that dismissed a minister after she was 
not reinstated to her old position following medical leave); Order Denying in 
Part Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 
No. 13-cv-2611-WJM-BNB, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013) (decid-
ing proposed order of Catholic nuns challenging the inclusion of contraception 
under the Affordable Care Act); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 134 S. Ct. 1512 (2014) 
(memorandum granting certiorari to inmate challenging prison beard policy 
on religious grounds).   
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B. EXTENDED SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHT 
A second explanation for increased resistance to the free 
exercise right—and a potential limitation on rights expansion 
more generally—is the extension of the right to broader classes 
of rights-holders. The clearest historical example is the incor-
poration of the free exercise right against the states.137 Ham-
burger attributes the shift from absolute to conditional protec-
tions in the middle of the twentieth century to “well-
intentioned efforts to enlarge a right” that were rooted in ar-
guments for religious exemptions.138 But he neglects the incor-
poration of the free exercise right.139 Prior to incorporation, “the 
occasions for conflict [under the federal free exercise clause] be-
tween church and state were few.”140 Growing conflicts between 
religious liberty and state interests likely arose not from in-
creased calls for religious exemptions but out of the post-
incorporation applicability of the federal free exercise clause to 
state and local laws.141 
The weakening of a right due to expansion of the class of 
rights holders may also occur in more discrete instances (which 
might provide an example of Hamburger’s “more is less” the-
sis). The Supreme Court alluded to this concern when it upheld 
a regulation that limited the scope of charitable solicitation by 
 
 137. It is even possible that incorporation represents a “more is less” phe-
nomenon if increasing the scope of the federal Bill of Rights to cover state and 
local governmental action through the Fourteenth Amendment led to dimin-
ished protections of the core of those rights previously guaranteed against only 
the federal government. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (“The necessary consequence of this decision [that 
Florida’s six-member jury statute satisfies the Sixth Amendment] is that 12-
member juries are not constitutionally required in federal criminal trials ei-
ther.”). But if “more is less” is an anti-incorporation argument, then Ham-
burger has a much bigger hurdle to overcome. See, e.g., School District of 
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 257 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of religion can 
hardly be questioned. . . .”). 
 138. See Hamburger, supra note 2, at 837 (“[T]he conditions imposed dur-
ing the last half of the twentieth century suggest how well-intentioned efforts 
to enlarge a right can inflate it so far as to weaken it.”); see also id., supra note 
2, at 835–36 (“In contrast, during the past forty years, the United States Su-
preme Court has repeatedly conditioned the right of free exercise on compel-
ling government interests.”). 
 139. The free exercise clause was incorporated in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). Hamburger mentions Cantwell several times, but 
never addresses its incorporation holding. See Hamburger, supra note 2. 
 140. MCCONNELL, ET AL., supra note 6, at 76. 
 141. See id. (describing how the expanded scope of the free exercise clause 
after incorporation increased conflicts between church and state). 
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the International Society for Krishna Consciousness at Minne-
sota’s annual state fair.142 The Court observed that while:  
[S]ome disorder would inevitably result from exempting the Krishnas 
from the Rule . . . there would be a much larger threat to the State’s 
interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and non-
commercial organizations could likewise move freely about the fair-
grounds distributing and selling literature and soliciting funds at 
will.143  
In other words, the Court believed that Minnesota could rea-
sonably accommodate a small number of exemptions but that a 
broader extension of those exemptions would undermine the 
state’s interest in controlling crowds at the fair.  
Although the Court analyzed the Krishna case solely on 
free speech grounds,144 the religious nature of the Krishnas ges-
tures toward concerns about expanding the class of rights-
holders in the free exercise context. A state might grant a reli-
gious exemption from a generally applicable law if only a small 
number of religious adherents will make use of the exemption. 
The military could tolerate a small number of conscientious ob-
jectors. The tax system could absorb a few religious exemp-
tions. But if massive numbers of citizens claimed a draft or tax 
exemption under a free exercise rationale, then the govern-
ment’s interest in maintaining military readiness or a reliable 
tax base could be jeopardized. Indeed, that principle seems to 
be operative in United States v. Lee, a case in which the Court 
denied to an Amish furniture maker an exemption from paying 
social security taxes.145 Cases like Lee suggest that when faced 
 
 142. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
654 (1981). 
 143. Id. at 653.  
 144. Id. at 659 n.3 (“Respondents’ complaint, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleges that Rule 6.05, on its face and as applied, violates both the Free Exer-
cise and the Free Speech Clauses. In their brief and in oral argument, howev-
er, respondents emphasize that they do not claim any special treatment be-
cause of Sankirtan, but are willing to rest their challenge wholly upon their 
general right to free speech, which they concede is identical to the right en-
joyed by every other religious, political, or charitable group.”). 
 145. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). The Court observed: 
[I]t would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social secu-
rity system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of re-
ligious beliefs. . . . The tax system could not function if denominations 
were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were 
spent in a manner that violates their religious belief. Because the 
broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a 
high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes af-
fords no basis for resisting the tax.  
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with the real or perceived threat of undermining widespread 
regulatory functions, the government will be less likely to hon-
or the right for anyone.146  
IV.  CULTURAL VIEWS ABOUT GOVERNMENT 
INTERESTS   
The preceding section explored shifting views about the 
free exercise right. This section turns to shifting views about 
the nature of governmental interests. That focus calls to mind 
Frederick Schauer’s suggestion that “constitutional salience” 
shapes the boundaries of the First Amendment.147 Schauer de-
fines constitutional salience as “the often mysterious political, 
social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and eco-
nomic forces that influence which policy questions surface as 
constitutional issues and which do not.”148 His description 
draws upon realist insights to highlight “a complex and seem-
ingly serendipitous array of factors that cannot be (or at least 
have not been) reduced to or explained by legal doctrine or by 
 
Id. at 259–60. See also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip 
op. at 47 (U.S. 2014) (“Because of the enormous variety of government expend-
itures funded by tax dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of their 
tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos.”). 
 146. Concerns about expanding the class of rights holders may also under-
lie the majority’s reasoning in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In rec-
ognizing a free exercise exemption for the Amish from Wisconsin’s compulsory 
education laws, the Court went out of its way to emphasize the historical par-
ticularity of the Amish faith, noting “almost 300 years of consistent practice, 
and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respond-
ents’ entire mode of life.” Id. at 219. The intuition underlying Yoder is that the 
Amish are peculiar enough to be given an exemption without significantly un-
dermining the state’s interest in public education. See also Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 
1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 130 (1989) (“Yoder, although an interesting case, is not 
thought to be doctrinally significant, especially since the Amish are a numeri-
cally insignificant group in relation to almost every aspect of American life.”). 
Similar arguments underlie the Court’s protection of closely held businesses 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
No. 13-354, slip op. at 29 (“HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly 
traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints 
would likely prevent that from occurring.”); id. at 45 (“HHS and the principal 
dissent argue that a ruling in favor of the objecting parties in these cases will 
lead to a flood of religious objections . . . but HHS has made no effort to sub-
stantiate this prediction.”). 
 147. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Prelim-
inary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 
(2004). 
 148. Id. 
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the background philosophical ideas and ideals of the First 
Amendment.”149 
Schauer’s inquiry highlights expressive restrictions that 
usually pass unnoticed, like our outlawing of perjury, antitrust 
violations, or insider trading.150 His doctrinal observations sug-
gest two important corollaries. The first is that some govern-
mental interests, unlike rights, are absolute at any given 
time—no right will prevail against them.151 The second is that 
the strength of some government interests changes over time.152 
These two corollaries together suggest that there is a dynamic 
“tipping point” at which a government interest is so strong that 
rights expansion that would challenge the government interest 
becomes impossible, unless and until the cultural support for 
the interest diminishes.153 
 
 149. Id. Constitutional salience serves as a proxy for “the outcome of a 
competitive struggle among numerous interests for constitutional attention.” 
Id. at 1788. Cf. FISH, supra note 67, at 102 (1994) (“Free speech, in short, is 
not an independent value but a political prize, and if that prize has been cap-
tured by a politics opposed to yours, it can no longer be invoked in ways that 
further your purposes, for it is now an obstacle to those purposes.”). For a real-
ist approach to the First Amendment with some resemblance to Schauer’s con-
stitutional salience, see J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal 
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 390 (1990), 
which describes the rhetorical shifts that accompanied “a loss of faith in the 
fundamental nature and coherence of an abstract liberty” with respect both to 
freedom of contract and freedom of speech. See also James Boyd White, Law 
As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 684, 688–91 (1985) (proposing the law is best understood as a 
form of “constitutive rhetoric.”). 
 150. Schauer, supra note 147, at 1170–71.   
 151. Cf. Schauer, supra note 18, at 305 (“Even speech at the core of the 
First Amendment may be restricted if the state interest is sufficiently 
strong.”). 
 152. Cf. Schauer, supra note 18, at 315 (highlighting the diversity of state 
interests and the difficulties such variations present for strict categorical 
analysis). 
 153. The absolute nature of some governmental interests helps to explain 
why the impossibility of absolutely protected expression (recall that this im-
possibility underlies my critique of Hamburger’s baseline claim) does not ne-
gate the conceptual possibility of absolutely unprotected expression. Indeed, 
the Court has recognized such categories of unprotected speech since 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, when it described “well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942). The Court has since specified that these categories include obscenity, 
defamation, fraud, incitement, and “speech integral to criminal conduct.” 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
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Some interests seem so strong, so widely endorsed, that we 
take them as obvious.154 To take an easy example, our current 
cultural context does not hold open the possibility that even the 
most deeply held views about human sacrifice will permit vol-
untary (let alone involuntary) acts of human sacrifice.155 Cer-
tain national security interests maintain a similar level of obvi-
ousness. Most of us are reasonably wary of people who conspire 
to overthrow our government, and we understand why prior re-
straints prevent disclosure of highly sensitive classified infor-
mation.156  
Some seemingly “obvious” interests become less obvious 
over time. We can illustrate this dynamism (and its relation-
ship to legal doctrine) by returning to the example of Davis v. 
Beason.157 In 1890, few would have doubted that the govern-
ment’s interest in restricting polygamy trumped the protections 
of the free exercise right (or any other right).158 But as recent 
events have shown, that may not be true today.159 The example 
 
 154. Cf. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (“[T]he evil to be restricted so overwhelm-
ingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of 
case-by-case adjudication is required. . . .” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982))).   
 155. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 344 (1890) (“Suppose one believed 
that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be 
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not 
interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”). 
 156. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would ques-
tion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting 
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and 
location of troops.”); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953) 
(recognizing the validity of the state secrets privilege). 
 157. 133 U.S. 333 (1980). 
 158. See Davis, 133 U.S. at 341–42 (“Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by 
the laws of all civilized and Christian countries. . . . They tend to destroy the 
purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade 
woman and to debase man. . . . To extend exemption from punishment for such 
crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the community.”). 
 159. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1222 (D. Utah 2013) (strik-
ing down key provisions of Utah’s anti-polygamy law). Importantly, the gov-
ernment’s interest in restricting Mormon polygamy at the end of the nine-
teenth century likely went beyond enforcing consensus norms about sexual 
morality to concerns over social stability. See Maura Strassberg, The Crime of 
Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 363 (2003) (“[B]y the mid-
nineteenth century, polygyny in general, and Mormon polygyny in particular, 
seemed to pose not a mere theoretical threat to the egalitarian and democratic 
government established in the United States. It had already produced a pow-
erful theocracy that showed itself more than capable of quickly populating and 
controlling the political, economic and social structure of the Western Territo-
ries. Therefore, stopping polygyny was understood as the key to thwarting the 
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of polygamy highlights a broader trend in the diminished sali-
ence of the government’s interest in maintaining public morali-
ty. In past times, and over First Amendment objections, the 
state has criminalized private behavior including obscenity,160 
nude dancing,161 and sodomy.162 Some of these restrictions are 
now seen as antiquated and paternalistic.163 Others remain in 
force. Norms can shift, and those shifts can bring about chang-
es in legal doctrine.164  
The shift in “public morality” reveals how some “obvious” 
governmental interests can lose their force over time. But cul-
tural views about governmental interests can also intensify. 
The clearest example of this phenomenon in recent years is the 
antidiscrimination norm.  
 
theocratic ambitions of the Mormon Church and establishing a secular rule of 
law in the West.”). 
 160. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957).  
 161. City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 302 (2000); Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571–72 (1991). 
 162. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); see also Karst, supra note 2, at 658 (reviewing motivations behind state 
anti-sodomy laws). 
 163. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (calling the restriction in Lawrence “uncommonly silly”), overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 164. The doctrinal shift away from morality-based justifications is evident 
in two recent Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 
(2010), and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
The decisions struck down regulations aimed at sexual fetishes involving the 
torture and killing of animals, Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481–82, and violent video 
games that included scenes of simulated rape and torture, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2742. In both cases, the challenged regulations were imprecise and over-
broad. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (describing the legislation as “seriously 
overinclusive”); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460 (“[Section] 48 is . . . substantially 
overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment.”). But what is 
interesting in the context of the present discussion is the relative inattention 
the Court gave to morality-based arguments. In Stevens, the Obama admin-
istration argued that the depictions of animal cruelty caused “injuries to hu-
man beings and the erosion of important public mores” and portrayed “patent-
ly offensive conduct that appeals only to the basest instincts.” Brief for 
Petitioner at 8, 9, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769). Citing John Locke, the 
government argued that “debasement of individuals and society causes wide-
spread, if sometimes inchoate, harm.” Id. at 35 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SOME 
THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 91 (John William Adamson, ed., 2007)). 
These arguments were nowhere to be found in the Stevens opinion. The moral-
ity arguments in Brown were more complicated because they were directed at 
the nexus of parental autonomy and state responsibility. Brief for Petitioner at 
39–41, Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448). But even 
in Brown, California’s arguments about “the societal interest in order and mo-
rality” were unpersuasive to the justices. Id. at 40.   
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Cultural support for the antidiscrimination norm has in-
tensified since the end of the Second World War and the growth 
of the civil rights movement for African-Americans.165 Scholars 
have attributed this growth to public recognition of the contri-
butions of African-Americans who served in the war and to the 
democratic ideals trumpeted by America in opposition to the 
fascism abroad.166 Changes in law and popular opinion em-
braced the antidiscrimination norm for race and gender 
through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other 
legislation.167  
Existing social realities belie the claim that the antidis-
crimination norm has achieved unqualified success for African-
Americans or that we have reached a “post-racial” society.168 
 
 165. See Ilya Somin, Public Opinion, Anti-Discrimination Law, and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 24, 2010, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2010/05/24/public-opinion-anti-discrimination-law-and 
-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964 (“By 1963, one year before the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act, 85% of whites polled in a National Opinion Research Center 
survey endorsed the view that ‘Negroes should have as good a chance to get 
any kind of job’ and rejected the position that ‘white people should have the 
first chance at any kind of job’ (endorsed by only 15%). This contrasts with 
55% who said that ‘white people should have the first chance’ on the same 
question in 1942 and 51% who said so in 1944.”); see also Paul Burstein, Public 
Opinion, Demonstrations, and the Passage of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 
43 PUB. OPINION Q. 157, 162–62 (1979) (graphing the increased societal oppo-
sition to discrimination); cf. Somin, supra (“[D]emocratic government is un-
likely to enact strong antidiscrimination laws to protect a group unless and 
until the majority of voters comes to oppose discrimination against it.”).  
 166. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality 
and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130 (2013) (“The ideology of the 
war was antifascist and prodemocratic, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
urged Americans to ‘refut[e] at home the very theories we are fighting 
abroad.’”). 
 167. Burstein, supra note 165, at 163.   
 168. See Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 967, 972 (2010) (suggesting that “the history, social reality, and life cir-
cumstances of people of color in this country do not support a broad adoption 
of the post-racial perspective within equal protection analysis”). Some scholars 
have even argued that the Court’s recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013), which invalidated key parts of the Voting Rights 
Act, marks the end of the civil rights era. Adam Winkler, The Supreme Court’s 
Ruling and the End of the Civil-Rights Era, THE DAILY BEAST (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/the-supreme-court-s-ruling 
-and-the-end-of-the-civil-rights-era.html; see also Gráinne De Búrca, The Tra-
jectories of European and American Antidiscrimination Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 1, 3 (2012) (“The socially transformative energy of the U.S. civil rights 
movement of the 1960s seems to have been drained and the powerful corpus of 
constitutional and federal antidiscrimination law that it brought with it has 
been significantly weakened following decades of political and legal back-
lash.”). 
INAZU_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:44 PM 
2014] MORE IS MORE 519 
 
Similar hurdles remain for efforts toward gender equality.169 
Still, consensus norms about the government’s antidiscrimina-
tion interest have generally intensified. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the context of gay rights, a story that also illus-
trates the interplay between legal doctrine and cultural views.  
Support for gay rights has been growing steadily since the 
early 1990s.170 In 1996, the year that Congress enacted the De-
fense of Marriage Act, only 25% of Americans supported gay 
marriage.171 By 2010, polls began showing a national majority 
in favor of gay marriage.172 In fact, “[p]ublic support for gay 
marriage in the United States increased at an average rate of 
about 1% annually from approximately the early 1990s to 2004 
and has increased at an average rate closer to 2% annually 
since then.”173 Similarly, “[t]he number of Americans believing 
that homosexuals should have equal employment rights grew 
from 56% in 1977 to 80% in 1997, and the number believing 
that gays should be legally permitted to adopt children rose 
from 14% to 50% over roughly the same time period.”174 These 
trends are likely to continue in light of strong support for gay 
rights among younger demographics.175  
As public opinion began to shift in the mid-1990s, the me-
dia began favorably depicting gay characters in popular televi-
sion shows.176 Support for gay rights also reached the worlds of 
 
 169. For accounts of persisting gender inequities, see, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, 
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2000); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, 
Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002). 
 170. Until the mid-1990s, same-sex marriage was not legal anywhere in 
the world. Klarman, supra note 166, at 130.  
 171. Andrew Gelman et al., Over Time, a Gay Marriage Groundswell, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at 3.  
 172. Id . 
 173. Klarman, supra note 166, at 155.  
 174. Id. at 133. 
 175. See Growing Public Support for Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.people 
-press.org/2012/02/07/growing-public-support-for-same-sex-marriage.  
 176. Klarman, supra note 166, at 133 (“[S]ome of the nation’s most popular 
situation comedies, such as Friends and Mad About You, began dealing with 
gay marriage—a virtually inconceivable development even five years earlier. 
In 1997, Ellen DeGeneres famously came out in a special one-hour episode of 
her popular television show Ellen—the first time in television history that a 
leading prime-time character had come out as gay. Forty-six million Ameri-
cans watched, and Time put her on its cover with the headline, ‘Yep, I’m Gay.’ 
A year and a half later, Will and Grace, which featured two openly gay men as 
major characters, launched its run as one of television’s most popular pro-
grams.”).  
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business and politics. By 2000, the number of Fortune 500 
companies that extended benefits to same-sex partners had ris-
en from zero to over a hundred, twelve states had extended 
their hate crime laws to cover sexual orientation, and eleven 
had forbidden workplace or public accommodation discrimina-
tion against gays.177 In the past five years alone, we have seen 
the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the passage of a federal 
hate crimes law and several state gay marriage laws, and the 
election of the first openly gay United States senator.178  
The Supreme Court’s treatment of gay rights has largely 
tracked these changes.179 In 1986, the Court affirmed the con-
stitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.180 The majority asserted that sexual orientation was not 
considered a protected class and that the justifications underly-
ing Georgia’s law survived rational basis scrutiny, although 
sharp dissents from Justices Stevens and Blackmun suggested 
otherwise.181  
The first significant Supreme Court opinion suggesting re-
ception to gay rights came a decade later in Romer v. Evans.182 
In that case, the Court overturned a voter-approved amend-
ment to Colorado’s constitution that would have prohibited 
state or local government from passing antidiscrimination laws 
protecting gays and lesbians.183 Romer cleared a path for the 
eventual overruling of Bowers, which came seven years later in 
 
 177. Id. at 133–34. 
 178. Id. at 134; Erik Eckholm, As Victories Pile Up, Gay Rights Advocates 
Cheer ‘Milestone Year’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P7. 
 179. Klarman, supra note 166, at 135 (“Sometimes in American history, 
social change occurs with extraordinary rapidity. Once that happens, Court 
decisions that were previously inconceivable become plausible.”); see also Bar-
ry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Consti-
tutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 936 (2001) (noting that judicial 
review “yields remarkably majoritarian results, and is a process that is differ-
ent from majoritarian politics but nonetheless responsive to it. In short, what-
ever judicial review is about, describing its operation requires something far 
more nuanced than the counter-majoritarian explanation provides”). 
 180. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
 181. Id. 
 182. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The year before, the Court held that requiring 
private parade organizers to allow the participation of an LGBT group would 
alter the expressive content of the parade and therefore violate the First 
Amendment rights of the organizers. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-
sexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995). 
 183. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.   
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Lawrence v. Texas.184 In that decision, a 5-4 majority invalidat-
ed a Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy.185  
In June of 2013, ten years after Lawrence, the Court hand-
ed down a landmark victory for gay rights in United States v. 
Windsor.186 Windsor struck down a key provision of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as between a 
man and a woman.187 Legally married gay couples are now rec-
ognized as such for the purposes of over 1,000 federal bene-
fits.188 Windsor stopped short of asserting a constitutional right 
to gay marriage, but held that the Act was discriminatory in 
that its “demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State 
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be 
treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal 
law.”189  
Both the cultural and legal developments in the area of gay 
rights illustrate the strong and growing support for the antidis-
crimination interest. The strength of that interest intersects in 
important ways with potentially weakened views about reli-
gious liberty. The convergence can be illustrated by the legisla-
tive responses to the Supreme Court’s 1990 Smith decision.190 
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) with overwhelming bipartisan support—the bill 
cleared the Senate with a vote of 97-3.191 After the Court invali-
dated key provisions of RFRA, congressional sponsors intro-
duced the Religious Liberty Protection Act in 1998 and 1999, 
which included narrower protections than RFRA.192 The bill 
went nowhere.193 The primary reason that the revised legisla-
 
 184. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.  
 185. Id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).  
 186. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 187. Id. at 2682. 
 188. Elizabeth B. Wydra, Reading the Opinions—and the Tea Leaves—in 
United States v. Windsor, 2012–13 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 95, 95; see also Amy 
Howe, A Home Run but Not a Grand Slam for Gay-Marriage Advocates: In 
Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog 
.com/2013/06/a-home-run-but-not-a-grand-slam-for-gay-marriage-advocates 
-in-plain-english.   
 189. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94. The Windsor Court concluded that 
“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.” Id. at 2695. 
 190. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 191. See 139 CONG. REC. 26,416 (1993). 
 192. S. 2081, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2148, 
105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 193. Laycock, supra note 114, at 412–13. 
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tion failed is that, between 1993 and 1998, people began to 
worry that strong protections for religious liberty could harm 
gays and lesbians.194  
More generally, the growing strength of the antidiscrimi-
nation norm may be placing increased pressure on the free ex-
ercise right. That pressure is not uniformly successful; the 
Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor provides an example 
of a religious liberty claim (rooted at the intersection of the free 
exercise clause and the establishment clause) protecting 
churches against certain antidiscrimination laws.195 But Ho-
sanna-Tabor will not by itself weaken the broader trajectory of 
antidiscrimination norms, particularly outside the context of 
what might end up being a very narrow application to employ-
ment decisions pertaining to church leaders.196 In other words, 
Hosanna-Tabor will not be likely to shift cultural views about 
antidiscrimination norms. 
V.  RIGHTS EXPANSION: WHEN MORE IS MORE   
The previous two sections suggested that pressures on the 
free exercise right may be at least partially attributable to 
shifting cultural views about religious liberty and the govern-
ment interests with which religious liberty claims intersect. At 
the very least, it suggests that diminished free exercise protec-
tions cannot be tied wholly or even largely to rights expansion, 
and that a blanket rejection of rights expansion is unwarrant-
ed. But the claim can be made even stronger; we know that 
rights expansion sometimes increases rights protection. This 
section considers two examples, one historical and one prospec-
tive.  
A. THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF THE FREE SPEECH RIGHT 
We know that the scope of the speech right has often in-
creased without compromising any of its core protections. In re-
sponse to arguments to expand the coverage of the free speech 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 196. See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious 
Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 824 (2014) (“[G]iven that only four of the justices 
in Hosanna-Tabor supported the Christian Legal Society in [Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)], the reach of the ministerial excep-
tion may be significantly curtailed when religious liberty confronts sexual ori-
entation discrimination beyond the narrow confines of ‘ministerial’ posi-
tions.”).  
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right, the Supreme Court has recognized the communicative 
potential in myriad acts that are not intuitively speech: burn-
ing a flag,197 dancing naked,198 and sleeping in a park,199 to name 
just a few. Commercial speech, once “uncovered” by the First 
Amendment, is now a form of protected speech.200 The stand-
ards for “uncovered” obscene expression have shifted to such a 
degree that broad swaths of pornographic material that would 
have been criminalized in an earlier era are now safely within 
contemporary community standards of decency.201 Animal crush 
videos,202 violent video games,203 and lies about military ser-
vice204 are now protected speech. The protections of the free 
speech right have expanded beyond its core, and the sky has 
not fallen.  
The expansion of the free speech right is also demonstrated 
in the litigation strategy of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and their 
attorney, Hayden Covington.205 During an era in which the 
Witnesses confronted massive ridicule, marginalization, and 
violence, Covington focused on four of the First Amendment’s 
rights working together with one another: speech, press, reli-
 
 197. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 198. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“[N]ude 
dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within 
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only mar-
ginally so.”).   
 199. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293–95 
(1984) (assuming that sleeping in the park might be expression covered by the 
First Amendment but upholding a National Park Service ban on overnight 
sleeping as a content-neutral restriction). 
 200. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976).   
 201. In a 2002 dissent, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he kind of hard-core 
pornography” at issue in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), “would 
be obscene under any community’s standard” and “does not belong on the In-
ternet.” Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 611 (2002) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). The brochure at issue in Hamling included “pictures por-
traying heterosexual and homosexual intercourse, sodomy and a variety of 
deviate sexual acts” involving one or more people, and, in two instances, a 
woman and a horse. 418 U.S. at 92–93 (describing the material). The eleven 
years since Stevens’s dissent have cast even greater doubt on his claim.   
 202. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467 (2010). 
 203. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 204. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). 
 205. For an overview of the Witnesses’ struggles with persecution, see 
SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSE-
CUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 1–18 (2000).   
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gion, and assembly.206 Tapping into the cultural salience of the-
se “Four Freedoms,” Covington appealed to the broad nature of 
the First Amendment’s protections, and his strategy led to 
scores of lower court victories and dozens of successful appeals 
to the Supreme Court.207 In some instances, these arguments 
led to stronger First Amendment protections than had previ-
ously been recognized. Consider, for example, the famous flag 
salute case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,208 in which the Court addressed the question of com-
pelled speech. As Joseph Blocher observes, Barnette “self-
consciously created a new ‘right not to speak,’ rather than 
simply applying existing First Amendment doctrine.”209  
B. THE PROSPECTIVE EXAMPLE OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 
The free speech right suggests that sometimes rights ex-
pansion can increase rights protection. By expanding the cov-
erage of the right, a greater cross-section of citizens may come 
to recognize the importance of First Amendment protections to 
their own circumstances, thus strengthening the periphery of 
the right without compromising the core.210 A similar possibility 
may exist with the right of association.  
 
 206. See generally Inazu, supra note 196. 
 207. See id. at 802 n.53. Covington did not always appeal to the Four Free-
doms together, and sometimes courts took the initiative upon themselves. See, 
e.g., Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of 
Thought, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 115 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew 
Koppelman eds., 2012) (“In questioning the general power of government to 
compel participation in a flag salute, the Court transformed the case from a 
dispute over special religious exemptions to one that implicated the freedom of 
speech of all students . . . . This re-conception of the central constitutional is-
sues at stake came largely at the Court’s own initiative. The briefs of the Wit-
nesses and their amici had focused almost exclusively on freedom of reli-
gion . . . .”). 
 208. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 209. Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 789 
(2012). 
 210. Kenji Yoshino has advanced a similar kind of salience argument in 
other contexts. See Yoshino, supra note 127, at 794 (“As the polity becomes 
more diverse . . . ‘rights talk’ can be a ground on which to create coalitions that 
embody broader, more inclusive forms of ‘we.’ For instance, movements for a 
‘right to education,’ a ‘right to health care,’ a ‘right to welfare,’ or a ‘right to 
vote’ that cut across traditional identity politics groups might helpfully erode 
the traditional group-based distinctions among them.”). Yoshino also notes 
Theda Skocpol’s observation of the consequences of failing to appeal to broader 
salience with antipoverty efforts: “when U.S. antipoverty efforts have featured 
policies targeted on the poor alone, they have not been politically sustainable, 
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The constitutional right of association is a relative late-
comer to our civil liberties.211 Its antecedent lies in the First 
Amendment’s right of assembly.212 The right of assembly en-
compassed groups of all kinds and imposed only one con-
straint—groups had to be peaceable.213 That broad understand-
ing narrowed when the Supreme Court shifted its gaze away 
from peaceability and recognized the right of association in 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.214 Justice Harlan’s opinion 
focused instead on “freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas.”215 
The right of association itself underwent a significant 
transformation in the Court’s 1984 decision in Roberts v. Unit-
ed States Jaycees.216 Justice Brennan’s majority opinion recog-
nized two different kinds of association in the Court’s previous 
cases.217 One line of decisions protected “intimate association” 
as “a fundamental element of personal liberty.”218 Another set of 
decisions guarded “expressive association,” which was “a right 
to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities pro-
 
and they have stigmatized and demeaned the poor.” Id. at 795 (quoting Theda 
Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat 
Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 414 (Christo-
pher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991)). 
 211. See generally INAZU, supra note 3, at 63–117 (tracing the origins of the 
right of association). 
 212. Id. at 20–62 (describing the origins of the right of assembly). 
 213. Id. at 21–25. The right of assembly is a stand-alone right not wedded 
to the separate petition right. See id. (discussing textual history). See also 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011) (making 
similar observations).  
 214. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The case arose after the State of Alabama sought 
to compel the NAACP to disclose its membership list. Alabama’s Attorney 
General John Patterson initiated an action to enjoin the NAACP from operat-
ing within the state, arguing that the group was a “business” that had failed to 
register under applicable state law. Id. at 452. The state court trial judge is-
sued the injunction ex parte, explaining that he intended “to deal the NAACP 
a mortal blow from which they shall never recover.” LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 165 (2000) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The judge also ordered the NAACP to produce its membership 
list, which Patterson had requested as part of a records review. Id. When the 
NAACP refused to comply, the judge responded with a $10,000 contempt fine, 
which he increased to $100,000 five days later. Id. at 166. After the Alabama 
Supreme Court rejected the NAACP’s appeal of the judge’s order through a 
series of disingenuous procedural rulings, the NAACP appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. Id. 
 215. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. 
 216. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).   
 217. Id. at 617–18. 
 218. Id. 
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tected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for 
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”219 These 
categories of intimate and expressive association jettisoned 
constitutional protection for a vast array of civil society groups 
that fell short of the requisite threshold of intimacy or expres-
siveness: social clubs, fraternities, sororities, gardening groups, 
book clubs, dinner groups—even bowling leagues.220 In other 
words, the shift from assembly to association and the further 
bifurcation of association may represent a third alternative to 
rights expansion and rights confinement—rights contraction. 
Neither of the associational categories in the Roberts base-
line withstands close scrutiny. The expressive distinction im-
plies that some groups are “nonexpressive,” but it becomes very 
difficult, if not impossible, to police this line apart from the ex-
pressive intent of the members of the group. Many groups that 
might seem to be “nonexpressive” could in fact articulate an 
expressive intent.221 The right of intimate association encoun-
ters similar line-drawing problems. All of the values, benefits, 
and attributes that courts assign to intimate associations are 
equally applicable to many, if not most, non-intimate associa-
tions.222  
The problems with intimate and expressive association can 
be seen in the 1989 case of Dallas v. Stanglin.223 The Supreme 
Court reviewed a city ordinance that restricted the age of ad-
mission to certain dance halls in order “to provide a place 
where teenagers could socialize with each other, but not be sub-
ject to the potentially detrimental influences of older teenagers 
and young adults.”224 The Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas had 
 
 219. Id. at 618. 
 220. The last example gestures toward Robert Putnam’s seminal study on 
the decline of civil society. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).  
 221. The “expressive” versus “nonexpressive” distinction is also complicat-
ed because its meaning is dynamic and subject to more than one interpretive 
gloss. See generally INAZU, supra note 3, at 160–62. 
 222. The Roberts opinion singled out intimate associations for heightened 
constitutional protection because they are capable of “cultivating and trans-
mitting shared ideals and beliefs,” they can “foster diversity and act as critical 
buffers between the individual and the power of the State,” they provide “emo-
tional enrichment from close ties with others,” and they help “safeguard[] the 
ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of 
liberty.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19. Many non-intimate associations perform 
some or all of these functions. For a more extensive critique, see INAZU, supra 
note 3, at 136–41. 
 223. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
 224. Id. at 21. 
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sued to enjoin city officials from enforcing the ordinance, as-
serting that it infringed upon the right of teenagers to associate 
with others outside of their age bracket.225 
The Court took pains to depict the skating rink as neither 
an intimate nor an expressive association. It first asserted that 
dance hall patrons “are not engaged in the sort of ‘intimate 
human relationships’” that give rise to the protections of inti-
mate association.226 It then claimed that the potential associa-
tions between teenagers and adults restricted by the ordinance 
“simply do not involve the sort of expressive association that 
the First Amendment has been held to protect” because “[t]he 
hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at this par-
ticular dance hall are not members of any organized associa-
tion; they are patrons of the same business establishment.”227 
The Court concluded that “the activity of these dance-hall pa-
trons—coming together to engage in recreational dancing—is 
not protected by the First Amendment.”228  
The Court’s analysis follows the logic of the categories of 
intimate and expressive association, but it reveals the arbitrar-
iness of the doctrinal line-drawing. Surely the patrons of a 
skating rink can form intimate bonds; for example, the “regu-
lars” of many service providers often form a kind of communi-
ty.229 Similarly, the activity of skating and the act of gathering 
to skate can be expressive in myriad ways. Even “recreational 
dancing” can foster social meaning.230  
 
 225. Id. at 22. 
 226. Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts). This claim is particularly odd for an opin-
ion written only two years after the blockbuster movie Dirty Dancing (Great 
American Films Limited Partnership 1987). 
 227. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24. 
 228. Id. at 25. 
 229. One fictional example is the Boston bar in the 1980s television series, 
Cheers (NBC television broadcast 1982–93) (the place “where everybody knows 
your name”). Closer to home, I can think of a number of conversations and 
even friendships that emerged for me while writing articles in the Mad Hatter 
coffee shop in Durham, North Carolina. 
 230. In 1885, an Illinois court reviewed a village ordinance that restricted 
as nuisances “all public picnics and open air dances within the limits of [the] 
village.” Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 18 Ill. App. 225, 225 (1885). Rejecting 
the ordinance, the court reasoned:  
The framers of the constitution inserted in that instrument a clause 
making inviolate the right of the people to assemble in a peaceable 
manner to consult for the common good, to make known their opin-
ions to their representatives, and to apply for redress of their griev-
ances. And it may well be supposed they would have added the right 
to assemble for open air amusements had any one imagined that the 
power to deny the exercise of such right would ever be asserted.  
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The problems with intimate and expressive association can 
be illustrated by another case involving the right of association, 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. 
University of Pittsburgh.231 The plaintiff fraternity engaged in a 
laundry list of illicit activity—a raid of their house by Pitts-
burgh police found “various drugs and drug paraphernalia, in-
cluding heroin, cocaine, opium, and Rohypnol (the ‘date rape’ 
drug).”232 Following the drug raid and subsequent criminal and 
civil sanctions against four of the brothers, the University of 
Pittsburgh decertified Pi Lamba Phi as a recognized student 
organization. The fraternity brought a Section 1983 claim, al-
leging violations of the right of association. The district court 
concluded that the fraternity was “primarily engaged in social 
activities” and did not qualify as an intimate or expressive as-
sociation.233 
On appeal, the Third Circuit dutifully applied the Roberts 
framework. It found that the fraternity lacked any characteris-
tics of an intimate association.234 It then concluded that the fra-
ternity failed to establish any threshold characteristics of an 
expressive association. Finally, it held that even if the fraterni-
ty were to have met the expressive threshold, the state’s denial 
of official recognition would only have had an “incidental” effect 
on the expressive nature of the fraternity.235 
 
Id. at 229–30. 
 231. 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Chi Iota Colony of Alpha 
Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that a college fraternity was neither an intimate nor an expressive 
association). For a thoughtful consideration of the applicability of intimate as-
sociation to fraternities, see Joshua P. Roling, Functional Intimate Association 
Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift To Save the Roberts Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 903 
(2012). 
 232. Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 439. It would take a lot of service projects 
and Santa breakfasts to offset the harm that the brothers of Pi Lambda Phi 
brought to the surrounding community. See id. at 444 (noting that Pi Lambda 
“once helped run a Halloween haunted house for the Pittsburgh School for the 
Blind, raised $350 through selling raffle tickets for a charity called the Gene-
sis House, and ran a ‘Breakfast with Santa’ to raise money for Genesis 
House”). 
 233. Id. at 441. 
 234. Id. at 441–42. The court based its determination on the fraternity’s 
size of between twenty and eighty members, the fact that the fraternity “ac-
tively recruits new members from the University population at large and it is 
not particularly selective in whom it admits,” and the fact that the group “in-
vites members of the public into its house for social activities and participates 
in many public University events.” Id. at 442. 
 235. Id. at 446–47. 
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This analysis has troubling implications, and it is entirely 
unnecessary. Pi Lambda Phi is an easy case. The fraternity 
should lose because the state has a compelling interest in regu-
lating and punishing the use of illegal drugs almost universally 
acknowledged as harmful. Almost nobody would question that 
holding or analysis.236 Instead, the court places the categories of 
intimate and expressive association just out of reach of the fra-
ternity and then concludes that the denial of official recognition 
would in any event not affect the group’s expression. That ar-
gument makes little sense in the context of a tight-knit social 
group like a fraternity.237 And while the brothers of Pi Lambda 
Phi may not appeal to our best visions of civil society, we need 
not look far to find more sympathetic examples, like the broth-
ers of the historically black fraternity, Omega Psi Phi.238  
Expanding the right of association beyond its current doc-
trinal contours might mean arguing for dispensing with the 
threshold inquiries into expressiveness and intimacy. It would 
extend constitutional protection to private social groups like 
fraternities and sororities from unwarranted government inter-
ference.239 That would not mean an absolute right to engage in 
any illegal conduct. It would require the state to justify specific 
applications of its compelling interest in the face of a stronger 
constitutional right to associational protection. And it would do 
nothing to impinge the “core” of the current right of association; 
intimate and expressive groups would still fall within an ex-
panded conception of the right without any diminishing of their 
constitutional protections.240  
VI.  A (PROSPECTIVE) CASE STUDY   
The preceding section suggested the possibility of rights 
expansion for the right of association. Increasing the scope of 
 
 236. These would be more contested if, for example, the illegal drug were 
something like peyote.   
 237. See Roling, supra note 231, at 923–28 (describing intimate character-
istics of some fraternities and other social groups). 
 238. See, e.g., AFRICAN AMERICAN FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES: THE 
LEGACY AND THE VISION (Tamara L. Brown et al. eds., 2012).   
 239. The kind of strategic expansion I have suggested would conceptually 
cover the Twilight Skating Rink. But I suggest in Part VI a different reason 
for limiting the application of the right of association to that particular plain-
tiff: the political compromise between commercial and non-commercial groups.    
 240. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the right of intimate association 
has very little practical value: any circumstance to which it conceptually ap-
plies is already protected under other rights frameworks. See INAZU, supra 
note 3, at 138–39. 
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protections under the right of association from the current 
baseline of intimate and expressive association might strength-
en cultural views more effectively than rights confinement. Im-
portantly, this possibility is not just a theoretical inquiry—it 
has implications for ongoing controversies. One of the most sig-
nificant examples pertains to the intersection of antidiscrimi-
nation law and First Amendment freedoms on the question of 
gay rights: To what extent must private groups yield to antidis-
crimination norms when it comes to the inclusion of gay and 
lesbian members in their services, activities, and membership? 
Cultural views are particularly relevant to this question 
because opposition to gay and lesbian inclusion is quickly be-
coming a minority view. As laws recognizing same-sex mar-
riage continue to unfold, it will soon be the case that only cer-
tain religious groups will impose sexual conduct distinctions 
that require celibacy outside of heterosexual marriage.241 That 
development places these exclusions in a different category 
than gender-based exclusions. A large number of non-religious 
groups make gender-based exclusions and will continue to do so 
for the foreseeable future.242 Almost no non-religious groups ex-
clude based on conduct restrictions requiring celibacy outside of 
heterosexual marriage.243 Significantly, these changes unfold in 
a cultural context that reflects growing support for the govern-
ment’s antidiscrimination interest. 
 
 241. I use the term “sexual conduct” rather than “sexual orientation” be-
cause most religiously based exclusions today are based on conduct rather 
than orientation. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Evangelical Scholars, in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 9, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-
1371) (“[A] distinction between inward desires and outward conduct is a com-
mon one in evangelical thinking and would apply in many areas of moral con-
duct.”). The Supreme Court rejected the distinction in the context of the mem-
bership restrictions of a private group in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 
561 U.S. 661, 688–89 (2010). For a critique of the Court’s reasoning, see John 
D. Inazu, Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1213, 
1233–36 (2012). Cf. ANDREW KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A 
RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? 81–104 (2009) (distinguishing gay status from gay 
conduct). But see Inazu, supra note 196 (describing a similar distinction raised 
in the context of racial discrimination in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574 (1983), and noting that many proponents of the antidiscrimination 
norm may simply not care whether exclusions are status-based or conduct-
based).   
 242. Some examples include fraternities, sororities, fitness clubs, shelters, 
sports teams, and sexually themed businesses.  
 243. These trends for nonreligious groups have accelerated in both public 
and private contexts, including the United States military (following the re-
peal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”) and the Boy Scouts of America (who recently 
decided to accept gay scouts but not gay leaders). 
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Religious groups seeking to limit the reach of antidiscrimi-
nation law confront a choice of right (free exercise or associa-
tion) and a choice of advocacy (rights expansion or rights con-
straint). Consider first the choice of right. The First 
Amendment conceivably protects religious groups that exclude 
based on sexual conduct under either the free exercise right or 
the right of association. It may be that arguing for protection of 
religious groups under either of these rights risks a “more is 
less” phenomenon in which judicial and political backlash 
would leave a previously protected “core” of the right with less 
stringent protections. But as I argued earlier in this Article, 
that worry is speculative at best.  
A number of scholars have argued that the protections for 
religious groups against antidiscrimination norms properly re-
side in the free exercise right (or related concepts like “religious 
conscience” or the “freedom of the church”).244 I am skeptical of 
these approaches for reasons that I explained in Part II of this 
Article; claims for religious exceptionalism are unlikely to pre-
vail against growing cultural resistance to the free exercise 
right. 
Because there may be less cultural resistance to the right 
of association, it is at least possible that this right may provide 
more protection even against the same government interest.245 
 
 244. See, e.g., MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM (2013); Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the Church: Source, 
Scope, and Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (2013); Richard W. Gar-
nett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Re-
ligion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and 
Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LE-
GAL COMMENT. 515 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 
J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the 
Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Churches As First Amendment Institu-
tions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009); Ste-
ven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in LEGAL RE-
SPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION 
AND ITS LIMITS 249 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012). 
 245. But see Marc DeGirolami, “Is More Less? Or is More More?”, Mirror of 
Justice (July 24, 2014), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/ 
mirrorofjustice/2014/07/is-more-less-or-is-more-more.html. DeGirolami sug-
gests that “the crux of the more/less debate [is] in changing societal perspec-
tives on the fundamental nature of government and its role in the lives of the 
citizen.” Id. He continues:  
If that is true, let me offer a point of agreement with [Inazu], and 
then perhaps a point of difference. The point of agreement is that in a 
society in which the government takes on more and more of a place 
and a role in the life of the citizenry, the protection of rights becomes 
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The associational right draws from a history with greater cul-
tural appeal to the secure beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of 
the free exercise right. In fact, the consistent protections pro-
vided by the right of association (and its antecedent, the right 
of assembly) for progressive movements reinforce its cultural 
salience. Many of the social activities that fostered the most 
significant political movements in our nation’s history would 
fail to qualify for heightened protection under the right of asso-
ciation—they would fall outside of the Court’s categories of ex-
pressiveness and intimacy.246 Of particular relevance, gay social 
clubs, important to the early gay rights movement, would fail to 
qualify for the protections of the current right of association.247  
There is also reason to think that rights expansion for the 
right of association could work similarly to rights expansion for 
the free speech right. With enough reflection, many people rec-
ognize the limitations inherent in their capacity to make and 
sustain moral judgments about the value of associational activ-
ities. Consider the Girl Scouts. An outside observer unfamiliar 
with this group might find himself somewhere between per-
plexed and amused by the merit badges, silly songs, and wildly 
successful cookie operation. But for the group’s members, these 
 
a zero sum game. More is more, because every inch gained is a gain 
for the right, and every inch lost is a gain for the state. The point of 
difference is that if this is so, then one should expect that with time it 
will begin to affect all rights, very much including the right of free 
speech. That is, the particular explanations for the more is more the-
sis that affect religious freedom (loss of the right’s prestige in popular 
sentiment) will eventually hit other freedoms too. That is because the 
key issue is not evolving cultural perceptions of the right’s strength 
and ambit, but evolving cultural perceptions of the strength and am-
bit of the state’s proper power. 
Id. 
 246. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS JR., FROM SLAV-
ERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 376–77 (1994) (describ-
ing “moments of informality” spread across clubs, literary parties, and other 
events that created “a cohesive force” among the leaders of the Harlem Re-
naissance); LINDA J. LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE 
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 17–19 (1997) (describing suffragist gatherings organized 
around banner meetings, balls, swimming races, potato sack races, baby 
shows, meals, pageants, and teatimes). 
 247. See Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 
659–61 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding associational rights of a gay student group); 
see also Brief of Gays & Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 11, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 
(2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 530513 (noting that gay organizations “have 
relied on exclusively gay environments in which to feel safe, to build relation-
ships, and to develop political strategy,” including “many exclusively gay social 
and activity clubs, retreats, vacations, and professional organizations”).   
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activities take on a different kind of meaning. That meaning 
shapes the identities of the individual members of the group 
and imbues on the group an identity of its own. These attach-
ments may well be temporally and contextually bound—most 
Girl Scouts likely do not experience the same intensity of be-
longing and connectedness to the group for the rest of their 
lives. But the meaning in the moment cannot be fully captured 
or understood from the outside. Understanding the practices of 
the Girl Scouts in some ways requires participation in the 
group. 
The Girl Scouts are an easy example because their liturgy 
is fairly rudimentary. What about the celebration of the Eucha-
rist in a Catholic church, the temple marriage in a Mormon 
tabernacle, or the Passover Seder in a Jewish synagogue? 
There should be little doubt that outsiders to these kinds of 
practices are unable to understand the significance, meaning, 
or value that they convey to participants, or whether they are 
sufficiently intimate or expressive. Recognizing these epistemic 
limits is also important in the context of the right of associa-
tion. Understanding our own interpretive limits and our vul-
nerability to the interpretive limits of others might persuade us 
of the value of extending broad protections to those activities 
that we hate—or that we do not understand—in the hope that 
others will do likewise with the activities that we cherish.248 In 
the free speech context, we are quick to invoke Justice Harlan’s 
observation that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”249 We 
 
 248. The difficulty of these epistemic limitations is underscored by Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s well-known discussion of a practice. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER 
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 175 (1981). MacIntyre defines a practice 
as:  
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excel-
lence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. 
Id. Internal goods on MacIntyre’s account can only be specified in terms of a 
practice and by means of examples from that practice. Id. at 176. Put more 
strongly, internal goods are sometimes only comprehensible within the context 
of a particular practice. In at least some cases, internal goods “can only be 
identified and recognised by the experience of participating in the practice in 
question” and “[t]hose who lack the relevant experience are incompetent 
thereby as judges of internal goods.” Id. 
 249. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). Mr. Cohen’s lyric was the 
word “Fuck.” Id. at 16. 
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might well adopt a similar posture toward the associational ac-
tivities of private groups. 
A second and distinct question from the choice of the right 
is the scope of the right. If I am correct in my prediction that 
only certain religious groups will maintain sexual conduct dis-
tinctions that exclude gays and lesbians, then the worry about 
increasing the burden on the government will be somewhat 
mitigated by social realities. But the scope concern remains rel-
evant to another sharply contested question: Should these pro-
tections extend to commercial groups? This question has arisen 
in several challenges to antidiscrimination law by commercial 
businesses.250 Its significance—and the influence of cultural 
views—is also illustrated by challenges to the requirement of 
contraception coverage under the Affordable Care Act.251 It is 
possible that a form of rights expansion to commercial groups 
may push too far and trigger backlash. 
  CONCLUSION   
Strengthening constitutional rights against governmental 
interests often involves a choice between rights confinement 
and rights expansion. Failing to make an informed wager about 
that choice risks distorting doctrine and missing opportunities. 
This Article has suggested that the best approach requires a 
careful consideration of history, culture, and law, which holds 
open the possibility that more is not always less, and indeed, at 
least some of the time, that more might be more. We will not 
know in advance whether rights confinement or rights expan-
sion charts the most effective course. But we can be certain of a 
related observation, illustrated by the Court’s narrowing of the 
right of association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees—less is 
always less.  
 
 250. See Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary Is the Right of Assembly?, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1403 (2012) (discussing examples of wedding photographers, 
pharmacists, and online dating services).   
 251. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. 2014). 
